Compensation for Expropriations in a World of Investment Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/Unlawful Distinction by Ratner, Steven
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Law & Economics Working Papers 
4-10-2017 
Compensation for Expropriations in a World of Investment 
Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/Unlawful Distinction 
Steven Ratner 
University of Michigan Law School, sratner@umich.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Working Paper Citation 
Ratner, Steven, "Compensation for Expropriations in a World of Investment Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/
Unlawful Distinction" (2017). Law & Economics Working Papers. 131. 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/131 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954146 
COMPENSATION FOR EXPROPRIATIONS IN A WORLD OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
BEYOND THE LAWFUL/UNLAWFUL DISTINCTION 
 
By Steven R. Ratner* 
 
 For much of the last century, global actors have sparred over the international legal rules 
governing the compensation a state should pay a foreign investor when it expropriates the latter’s 
property. The competing claims have had many dimensions, including the content of customary 
international law and the line between bona fide regulations and expropriations. In the modern 
age of international investment agreements (IIAs), a debate continues over another key issue: 
When a state expropriates a foreign investment in violation of an IIA, where should a tribunal 
look for the standard of compensation—to the amount the treaty requires the state to pay when it 
expropriates, or to an external standard for violations of international law generally? Each is 
alluring to a tribunal for its legal visibility—one spelled out in the very text under examination, 
and one stemming from a venerable international court case. But they may point to significantly 
different results for the investor and the host state. And investor-state tribunals remain wildly 
inconsistent, even incoherent, in their choice and use of those standards. It remains a significant 
source of disagreement in contemporary investor-state arbitration.1  
 Today’s debate arises from the basic terms of modern IIAs. They typically ban host states 
from expropriating foreign investors unless—or, we might say, permit such expropriations only 
if—the state meets four conditions. These treaty conditions are, to simplify, that the taking be (a) 
for a public purpose; (b) carried out in a nondiscriminatory manner; (c) in accordance with some 
kind of legal process; and (d) accompanied by payment of (usually) full compensation for the 
value of the expropriated asset, usually specified as of the date of the expropriation, often with 
more details regarding acceptable valuation techniques and interest.2 For the sake of simplicity, 
we can call the first three process conditions, as they govern the manner of the expropriation, and 
the fourth as a payment condition, as it governs the monetary output of the process. The state can 
force a surrender of the property by paying the investor an amount specified by a third party, i.e., 
in the treaty; yet it must follow certain criteria and cannot just pay the investor to waive those 
process rights.3 Satisfaction of those four criteria legitimates the transfer, but compensation alone 
does not.4  
                                                
* Bruno Simma Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I 
appreciate comments from Charles Brower, William Dodge, Zachary Douglas, Jeffrey Dunoff, 
James Hines, Rachael Kent, Kyle Logue, Sean Murphy, Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Mathias 
Reimann, Bruno Simma, and participants in the University of Michigan Law School Legal 
Theory Workshop. I thank Nicholas Ognibene and Peri Tenenbaum for excellent research 
assistance.  
1 See the differences between the majority and dissenting arbitrators in Quiborax v. Bolivia, 
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/06/2, Award and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Brigitte Stern 
(Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Quiborax]. 
2 See <8>UNCTAD<8>, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: KEY ISSUES VOLUME I, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/10, 243–46 (2004). 
3 These two categories of restrictions in the IIA are similar to liability rules and property 
rules in the sense of Calabresi and Melamed, but not quite the same. Both of those rules are 
closely associated with court-ordered remedies (compensation in the former, injunction in the 
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 So now consider these scenarios where states expropriate:  
 
  
(1) The host state expropriates consistent with all four treaty criteria, in which case the 
investor is unlikely to sue under an IIA (and should lose if it does).  
(2) The host state expropriates in conformity with the three process conditions, but it does 
not pay the investor anything, or at least less than full compensation, which can prompt 
investor-state arbitration.  
(3) The host state expropriates in conformity with only some of the process conditions, while 
also not paying, which can also lead to arbitration.  
(4) The host state violates any or all of the process conditions while paying full 
compensation, a possibility that could, but probably will not, lead an investor to litigate 
over the flawed procedures.  
 
Multiple layers of complexity can be added, including simultaneous violation of other IIA 
provisions. And the host state will often deny that it is expropriating at all, in which case the 
tribunal will need to make that threshold determination. 
 The inconsistency and incoherence in the case law arises, then, over whether the 
compensation should be based on the formula in the treaty ((d) above)—an internal standard; or 
customary international law, in particular that reflected in the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility (ASRs)—an external standard. Under the latter, the state, for its 
violation of the treaty, must pay full reparation, which may be more than the amount in the 
treaty. Tribunals disagree over these options, but do not consider approaches beyond them.  
 To date, the jurisprudence has been dominated by an anachronistic and analytically 
unhelpful distinction between the compensation or damages to be paid for so-called “unlawful 
expropriations” and those for so-called “lawful expropriations”—concepts traceable to the 
venerable Chorzów Factory case reflexively cited by tribunals.5 Historically, the former has 
referred to expropriations that violate certain legal commitments the state has made (in treaties, 
or even contracts) and the latter to expropriations that respect those commitments. But the case 
law is replete with diverse definitions of the two terms. More important, tribunals disagree on 
whether the state expropriating “unlawfully” or “illegally” should have to pay more to the 
investor than when it expropriates “lawfully” or “legally”—and in particular whether the former 
triggers damages under customary law, whereas the latter leads only to the amount in the treaty.  
 To return to our four scenarios, tribunals in particular disagree as to whether Scenario 2 
or Scenario 3, or both, are “unlawful expropriations” due to the state’s violation of the treaty’s 
requirements, whereas Scenario 1 is a “lawful expropriation” because the state has followed the 
treaty; and the consequences of that distinction for damages. Among the most significant 
                                                                                                                                                       
latter), whereas the IIA itself specifies the compensation for expropriation and generally 
investors do not have the ability to prevent takings by host states. Cf. JOOST PAUWELYN, 
OPTIMAL PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: NAVIGATING BETWEEN EUROPEAN ABSOLUTISM 
AND AMERICAN VOLUNTARISM 148–50 (2008) (using these terms to describe IIA protections).  
4 See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 
1335, 1348–57 (1986).  
5 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 1928 PCIJ Rep. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13) 
[hereinafter Chorzów Factory]. 
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decisions to make and monetize the distinction is Yukos v. Russia, a case under the Energy 
Charter Treaty that regarded Russia’s seizure of claimants’ shares of the Russian oil giant as 
“unlawful” under Scenario 3 (indeed, it found none of the process conditions to be met) and 
awarded investors 50 billion dollars.6 Scholars have parsed the case law, but a normative theory 
for treating the various scenarios for violations, including any relevance to the lawful/unlawful 
distinction, remains elusive. 
 The fluidity in the law is also part of larger debates over the kinds of state action 
international investment agreements should regulate. The political economy of investment law 
has shifted from one focused on investor protection—in particular, Northern investment in the 
South—to one with greater attention to host state prerogatives (“policy space”), respect for 
human rights, and duties on (and not merely rights for) business entities. Consequently, the 
characterization of a state’s taking of property and the consequences for the state from alternative 
characterizations of the taking assume great importance. How we compensate the investor in the 
context of takings will also affect our approach to remedies for other violations of IIAs, where 
the treaties are silent. This debate crosses the regimes of international investment law and state 
responsibility, raising important questions about the nature of international legal obligations and 
the consequences of their breach.  
 This article, then, attempts to cut through the confusion surrounding the choice of 
remedies for expropriations based on standards internal to an IIA or external to it, and the 
concomitant lawful/unlawful panacea, and to offer a theoretical framework for determining the 
remedies for them. The lawful/unlawful dichotomy—and the assumption that the distinction 
maps onto two alternative and exclusive remedies—is antiquated and normatively deficient. It is 
a story of tribunals grasping for familiar, but outdated, legal concepts that lack any analytical 
punch for determining compensation and that reflect a rigid sort of doctrinal thinking. Indeed, 
when IIAs and custom are viewed as a whole, it becomes clear the law does not point to a simple 
choice of one internal or external standard. We instead need to develop a new approach by 
considering explicitly the purposes of the rules for compensation for expropriation in the context 
of the contemporary foreign investment process.  
 I develop this thesis as follows. Part I looks back to the origin of the current doctrinal 
muddle, namely the multiple understandings attached to, and consequences of, “lawful” and 
“unlawful” expropriations. Part II provides the normative framework for analyzing various 
doctrinal approaches, setting forth five generally accepted goals for any remedies for 
expropriation. Part III examines the principal alternatives for determining damages in the event 
of treaty-violative expropriations and how each fares in terms of advancing the goals for 
remedies. Part IV then takes my preferred position for a new approach—one that keys the 
remedies to the nature of the expropriatory act vis-à-vis the four criteria in investment treaties—
and considers its implications for damages. Part V considers the possibility of extending this 
framework to remedies for other IIA violations. I conclude with a few observations about the 
implications of my approach for the relationship between host state obligations and remedies in 
international investment law more generally. 
 Finally, a word on the scope of this study: The question of internal versus external 
standards for compensation is one of a number of issues facing the international law of 
                                                
6 See Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Fed’n, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. AA 227 
(July 18, 2014), set aside, Russian Fed’n v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd., Yukos Universal Ltd., and 
Hulley Enterprises Ltd., Hague Dist. Ct. (Apr. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Yukos].  
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expropriation. To keep the focus on this issue, I will need to bracket other issues, already the 
subject of significant scholarship, including the contours of the law on indirect expropriation 
(regulatory takings), the possibility of a lesser payment to the investor after large-scale 
expropriations, the deference due to local procedures for providing compensation, and the types 
of property that may or may not be subject to expropriation.  
 
I. A LOOK BACK AT A CONFOUNDING DISTINCTION 
 
 The current state of the case law originates in, and still cites with regularity, a line of 
cases that emphasized the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations. Those cases 
are often cited by advocates, invoked by courts, or endorsed by scholars, many times with little 
appreciation of the different meanings the two key terms assumed over time. 
 
A. The Pre-IIA Era  
 
1. From Chorzów Factory to the Oil Expropriation Cases  
 
 If we had to assign a birth date to the lawful/unlawful distinction, it would probably be 
September 13, 1928, when the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) issued its ruling 
on the indemnity Poland had to pay to Germany for the former’s seizure of the German-owned 
nitrate plant in Upper Silesia in the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów. That case has long 
stood for an authoritative pronouncement of the basic duty on a state that breaches its legal duties 
to provided full reparation—more specifically, for a remedy that serves to “wipe out all the 
consequences” of the breach—a position endorsed in the ILC’s ASRs. But it has also generated 
countless citations for its passages that attempt to: (a) define, and set up the distinction between, 
lawful and unlawful expropriations; and (b) quantify that difference through a series of 
instructions by the judges to outside experts regarding the calculation of damages.  
 The PCIJ had already determined in 1926 that Poland’s seizure of the German-owned 
factory violated the 1922 Geneva Convention Concerning Upper Silesia that prohibited most 
taking of foreign property.7 Indeed, in that phase of the case, it interpreted the Convention to the 
effect that if a taking were not in conformity with Articles 6–24 of that treaty, “expropriation is 
unlawful.”8 In 1928, as it turned to the question of damages, it characterized that violation as 
follows: 
 
The action of Poland . . . contrary to the Geneva Convention is not an expropriation—to 
render which lawful only the payment of fair compensation would have been wanting; it 
is a seizure of property . . . which could not be expropriated even against compensation, 
save under the exceptional conditions fixed by Article 7 of the said Convention [i.e., with 
the permission of a mixed commission for the first fifteen years]. . . . [R]eparation is in 
this case the consequence not of the application of Articles 6 to 22 of the Geneva 
Convention, but of acts contrary to those articles.9 
                                                
7 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 PCIJ Rep. (ser. A) No. 
7 (May 25). 
8 Id. at 21.  
9 Chorzów Factory, supra note 5, at 46.  
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In the next two paragraphs, it reiterated the distinction between a “lawful liquidation” and an 
“unlawful dispossession” or “illegal act.” Thus, the central defining feature of the unlawful 
expropriation of the factory was that Poland violated the Geneva Convention, as previously 
determined by the Court. If Poland had taken over foreign property according to the terms of the 
treaty, it would have been a lawful expropriation.  
 For the PCIJ, this distinction had direct consequences for the damages due Germany. In 
its key holding, it said: 
 
[T]he compensation due to the German Government is not necessarily limited to the 
value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus interest to the day of 
payment. This limitation would only be admissible if the Polish Government had had the 
right to expropriate, and if its wrongful act consisted merely in not having paid to the two 
Companies the just price of what was expropriated; in the present case, such a limitation 
might result in placing Germany and the interests protected by the Geneva Convention . . 
. in a situation more unfavourable than that in which Germany and these interests would 
have been if Poland had respected the said Convention. Such a consequence would not 
only be unjust, but . . . incompatible with the aim of the . . . Convention—that is to say, 
the prohibition, in principle, of the liquidation of the property . . . of German nationals 
and . . . companies . . . in Upper Silesia—since it would be tantamount to rendering 
lawful liquidation and unlawful dispossession indistinguishable in so far as their financial 
results are concerned.10 
 
 One should notice three core points from this passage. First, the Court seems to posit that 
the amount due Germany for a lawful expropriation was the “value of the undertaking at the 
moment of dispossession” (plus interest), which it calls the “just price of what was 
expropriated.” I will call that value FVDE, for “full value on the date of expropriation.”11 Second, 
the Court is adamant that, as a matter of justice, the unlawful expropriation must be compensated 
at a higher level than the lawful compensation. Third, and somewhat confusingly, the Court 
suggests that if Poland’s “wrongful act” had merely been nonpayment of the value at the moment 
of the taking, that amount would be all that was due—even though it would seem that a denial of 
payment is wrongful as well.  
 From this starting point, the Court then developed its famous holding that a remedy for 
unlawful acts must “wipe out all the consequences” of them.12 It then instructed experts to 
quantify this amount, though its instructions reflected antiquated understandings of the value of 
an asset—with physical and other committed assets (damnum emergens) and lost profits (lucrum 
cessans) separated out. It offered two valuation options that have flummoxed arbitrators, 
academics, and valuation experts ever since—(a) one that seems based on the sum of FVDE (or 
maybe just the damnum emergens) plus profits from the date of expropriation to the date of the 
award; and (b) another based on the value of the undertaking (or again, maybe just the damnum 
                                                
10 Id. at 47.  
11 I leave aside for now whether that full value is based solely on information at the time of 
the expropriation or information that later became available. In any case, it should not reflect any 
change in value due to knowledge of the expropriation before it actually occurred.  
12 Chorzów Factory, supra note 5, at 47. 
5
Ratner:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
 6 
emergens) at the time of the award.13 The Court never directly explained exactly how its “wipe 
out all the consequences” standard would provide a different level of compensation from the 
“value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession,” though, as discussed below, some 
read it to imply that the two formulas offered above can result in a higher award for the latter 
than the former.14  
 The major arbitrations concerning the nationalizations of Western oil interests in the 
Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s invoked Chorzów Factory’s distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriations. In BP Exploration v. Libya (1973), where no treaty governed Libya’s 
treatment of foreign investment, the sole arbitrator, Gunnar Lagergren, was careful to distinguish 
Chorzów Factory as a case concerned solely with expropriations in violation of treaties.15 He 
referred to Libya’s expropriation as a “wrongful act” by virtue of its breach of the concession 
agreement, but not as a wrongful or unlawful expropriation.16 As a result, he rejected BP’s 
claims that it was entitled to full enjoyment of its rights under the concession. The parties settled 
before an award on damages was issued.  
 However, four years later, in Texas Overseas Petroleum Company (TOPCO) v. Libya 
(1977), arbitrator René-Jean Dupuy found that the claimant’s contract with Libya was an 
“internationalized contract,” and that Libya breached its duty under both Libyan and 
international law (both of which governed the concession agreement) to perform it.17 Dupuy 
turned to Chorzów Factory, other cases, and scholars, and ruled that the proper remedy for an 
“unlawful act” was nothing less than restitutio in integrum—full performance of the contracts it 
had breached.18 That rather audacious ruling has not been followed in an expropriation case 
since.19 In relying on remedies for an unlawful act, Dupuy thus suggested that an expropriation 
could be unlawful as a matter of customary international law merely if it violated a contract 
between the host state and the foreign investor.20  
 In two other leading cases, Libyan American Oil Company v. Libya (1977) and Kuwait v. 
American Independent Oil Company (1982), the arbitrators also distinguished between lawful 
and unlawful expropriations, in both cases rejecting the characterization of the respondent state’s 
act as unlawful and adopting a damages formula that they claimed reflected the investors’ 
                                                
13 Id. at 51–52. 
14 For a charitable interpretation, see Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, Chorzów’s 
Standard Rejuvenated: Assessing Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 
103, 105–08 (2008). 
15 BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Libyan Arab Rep., 53 ILR 297, 337–40 (1973). 
16 Id. at 329, 355. 
17 Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. (<8>TOPCO<8>) v. Libyan Arab Rep., 17 ILM 1, paras. 
93–109 (1977). 
18 Id., para. 103; see also id., paras. 97–109, dispositif. 
19 See Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in 
International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 321 (1982) (favoring restitution in principle but 
finding “very little evidence that [it] is perceived as a required remedy or that it is anticipated as 
being likely to be granted.”). 
20 For academic endorsement of an unlawful taking as one violating a concession agreement, 
see C.F. Amerasinghe, Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of 
Recent Cases and Practice, 41 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 22, 37 (1992). 
6
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 131 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/131
 7 
expectations.21 So while the distinction developed between the two sorts of characterizations 
remained, the one suggested by Dupuy in TOPCO remained the outlier.    
 
2. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
 
 Other than Chorzów Factory, the most significant case law addressing lawful/unlawful 
expropriations took place in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in cases still cited by counsel and 
tribunals. The Tribunal was charged under the 1981 Algiers Accords with adjudicating claims of 
“expropriations or other measures affecting property rights”; the law for determining those 
claims included the U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 
1955.22 The context for addressing the distinction was Iran’s argument in many cases that if a 
state engaged in a lawful expropriation—which it insisted was the correct characterization of its 
acts against U.S. companies—it need not pay full value (even FVDE) to the investor, but rather 
significantly less or even nothing at all.23 Two cases demonstrate the allure of Chorzów 
Factory’s distinctions to the tribunal.  
 In INA v. Iran (1985), the Tribunal addressed the claim of an American insurance 
company for the expropriation of its Iranian subsidiary. The panel noted that  
 
expropriations for a public purpose and subject to conditions provided for by law—
notably that category which can be characterised as ‘nationalisations’—are not per se 
unlawful. A lawful nationalisation will, however, impose on the government concerned 
the obligation to pay compensation.24  
 
It did not, however, explain the connection between a breach of the Treaty of Amity and an 
unlawful expropriation. While the Tribunal admitted that a full-scale nationalization might not 
require full compensation, both treaty and custom demanded it in the case of the small-scale 
taking of INA (which it suggested, but did not actually say, was lawful). In separate opinions, 
                                                
21 Libyan Am. Oil Co. (Liamco) v. Libya, 20 ILM 1, 59, 61, 76–77 (1981); State of Kuwait 
v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 ILM 976, 1024, paras. 102, 104; 1025, paras. 109–110; 1031, para. 
138; 1034, paras. 148–49 (1982). 
22 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Art. II, Jan. 19, 1981; Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 284 UNTS 93. Article 4(2) 
of the latter provides that property of nationals of each state “shall not be taken except for a 
public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation.”  
23 See Martin J. Valasek, A “Simple Scheme”: Exploring the Meaning of Chorzów Factory 
for the Valuation of Opportunistic Expropriation in the BIT Generation, 4 TDM 6, 42 (2007); 
see generally Matti Pellonpää, Compensable Claims Before the Tribunal: Expropriation Claims, 
in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 185, 198–217 (Richard B. Lillich & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds., 1998). 
24 INA Corp. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 161, 8 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 373, 378 
(Aug. 12, 1985). 
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three arbitrators discussed the different levels of compensation for lawful versus unlawful 
takings.25 
 The most extended discussion of the issue took place in Amoco International Finance 
(AIF) v. Iran (1987), concerning Iran’s seizure of AIF’s 50 percent interest in Khemco, which 
produced natural gas and related products.26 Of all the Tribunal’s cases, this one still garners the 
most attention on the internal/external standard for compensation and lawful/unlawful 
distinction. The Tribunal applied the Treaty of Amity to Iran’s acts, in each case finding no 
violation and concluding it was not unlawful for those reasons.27 Thus the Tribunal made a clear 
linkage between illegality and breach of a treaty.28 The conclusion that the expropriation was 
lawful proved critical for the Tribunal’s views on the source of the standard for compensation:  
 
Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty determines the conditions that an expropriation 
should meet in order to be in conformity with its terms and therefore defines the standard 
of compensation only in case of a lawful expropriation. A nationalization in breach of the 
Treaty, on the other hand, would render applicable the rules relating to State 
responsibility, which are to be found not in the Treaty but in customary law.29  
 
 Even though the Tribunal had found the expropriation lawful, it turned to Chorzów 
Factory as “also illuminating.”30 It then reinterpreted the questions that the PCIJ had put to the 
experts to elaborate on the difference between the damages for a lawful expropriation compared 
to an unlawful one. In a ruling that seemed to lack much understanding of valuation methods, it 
concluded that lost profits were to be included as damages only for unlawful expropriations, and 
                                                
25 Id. at 385–90 (Lagergren, sep. op.) (calling discriminatory expropriations “inherently 
unlawful” and entitling investor to damages “as closely as possible in monetary terms to . . . 
restitutio in integrum,” while large-scale nationalizations may call for less than full 
compensation); id. at 393–401 (Holtzmann, sep. op.) (disagreeing with Lagergren’s latter 
proposition); id. at 411 (Ameli, dissenting) (unlawful measures involving breach “of its 
international obligations” including “its contractual obligations,” may allow for restitutio in 
integrum). See also Sedco v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. and the Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 129, 10 
Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 180, 187 (Mar. 27, 1986) (full value applies to a “discrete 
expropriation of alien property,” “whether or not the expropriation itself was otherwise lawful”) 
[hereinafter Sedco].  
26 Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. (AIF) v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case. No. 56, 15 Iran-U.S. Claims 
Trib. Rep. 189 (July 14, 1987) [hereinafter AIF].  
27 Id. at 234, para. 147.  
28 It further found the breach of the contract by AIF’s Iranian partner was not an unlawful act 
by Iran because Iran was not party to the contract, concluding that AIF’s interests were “lawfully 
expropriated by Iran.” This second finding suggests indirectly that illegality can arise from a 
breach of contract as well. Id. at 244, para. 182.  
29 Id. at 246, para. 189. 
30 Id. at 247, para. 195.  
8
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 131 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/131
 9 
seemed to rule out discounted cash flow (DCF) as a method of valuation. Yet it then went ahead 
and applied a DCF evaluation after all.31 
 That dicta elicited a lengthy concurring opinion from Judge Brower. He accepted the idea 
of a distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation, but offered a different interpretation 
of Chorzów Factory: 
 
If an expropriation is lawful, the deprived party is to be awarded damages equal to “the 
value of the undertaking” which it has lost, including any potential future profits, as of 
the date of taking; in the case of an unlawful taking, however, either the injured party is 
to be actually restored to enjoyment of his property, or, should this be impossible or 
impractical, he is to be awarded damages equal to the greater of (i) the value of the 
undertaking at the date of loss (again including lost profits), judged on the basis of 
information available as of that date, and (ii) its value (likewise including lost profits) as 
shown by its probable performance subsequent to the date of loss and prior to the date of 
the award, based on actual post-taking experience, plus (in either alternative) any 
consequential damages. Apart from the fact that this is what Chorzów Factory says, it is 
the only set of principles that will guarantee just compensation . . . .32 
 
 Both the majority and the concurrence thus resurrected Chorzów Factory’s distinction 
between lawful and unlawful expropriations, and agreed that it affected the amount to be paid the 
investor, even though the majority thought it was only about whether to include lost profits. 
Brower’s innovation was to read Chorzów Factory to mean that the target of the unlawful 
expropriation could choose the date of valuation. The investor could pick the larger of :(a) the 
FVDE, as valued according to modern DCF techniques, and thus not limited to damnum 
emergens; and (b) the full value on the date of the award—which I will call FVDA—again as 
valued according to modern DCF techniques.33 
 Scholars and arbitrators have spilled much ink on whether the majority or Judge Brower 
interpreted Chorzów Factory correctly.34 I will not go down that route because, in the end, that 
exercise involves an interpretation of a part of the PCIJ judgment based on an anachronistic 
method of valuation, one that separated out damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, rather than 
modern financial terms.35 Chorzów Factory’s valuation formulas reached their expiration date 
decades ago.  
 The pre-IIA era thus left a legacy of doctrinal messiness. Tribunals seized on the 
lawful/unlawful distinction but disagreed on: (a) the criteria for illegality (e.g., breach of a 
                                                
31 Id. at 248–52, paras. 197–206; 258–64, paras. 227–46. For excellent critiques, see William 
C. Lieblich, Determinations by International Tribunals of the Economic Value of Expropriated 
Enterprises, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 37, 57–67 (1990); Valasek, supra note 23, at 16–20. 
32 AIF, supra note 26, at 300–01, para. 18 (Brower, concurring). 
33 The Tribunal elaborated a bit on the distinction a few years later, holding that even lawful 
expropriations required payment of full value, while unlawful expropriations might require either 
restitution or payment for “any increase in the value of the property between the date of taking 
and the date of the [award].” Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 39, 21 
Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 79, 122, para. 110 (June 29, 1989).  
34 For a recent example, see the competing opinions in Quiborax, supra note 1.  
35 I elaborate on this point in Part IV.A below. 
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contract, breach of a treaty, or other factors like discriminatory conduct); and (b) the 
consequences for damages, e.g., whether one or the other entitled the investor to restitutio in 
integrum, FVDA, FVDE, or even something much less.  
 
B. Enter the IIA Era 
 
 One might have thought that tribunals adjudicating IIA claims could shed references to 
lawful or unlawful expropriations. Those meeting the criteria in the treaty would either not lead 
to litigation or not lead to any liability; and expropriations in violation of the treaty would be 
identified as treaty violations first and foremost. The remedy for those violations might be a 
based on a lex specialis for investment law (even in the treaty itself) or on the fallback position 
of customary law, but the lodestar of the analysis would be that the treaty had been violated.36 
 Yet counsel to investor-state disputes and many tribunals still deploy the distinction 
terminologically and substantively. The range of tribunal views, and the diversity of investments 
valued in current arbitrations, makes each case unique and grouping them somewhat difficult.37 
Moreover, we can never be certain whether the stated position of the tribunal is actually doing 
any work in arriving at the final damages number given the mystery involved in those figures. 
Nonetheless, four basic positions seem to have emerged:38 
  
Group 1—Compensation Based on Treaty Formula, Silence on the Lawful/Unlawful 
Distinction: Numerous IIA cases have found that the state expropriated the claimant’s 
investment in violation of an IIA and yet did not rely on any distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriations in their award of damages. The tribunals avoided addressing the 
distinction and turned to the treaty standard of FVDE as the basis for damages. These include: 
Metalclad v. Mexico (2000);39 Wena Hotels v. Egypt (2000);40 Middle East Cement v. Egypt 
(2002); 41  Tecmed v. Mexico (2004); 42  Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhstan (2008); 43  Sistem 
Muhendislik Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret v. Kyrgyz Republic (2009);44 Occidental Petroleum v. 
Ecuador (2012); 45 Abengoa y Cofides v. Mexico (2013);46 SAUR v. Argentina (2014);47 and 
Tenaris and Talta-Trading E Marketing v. Venezuela (2016).48 
                                                
36 Arbitrations whose governing law was customary international law or a state’s domestic 
law would still need to adopt the distinction. 
37 See Meg Kinnear, Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 551, 559–60 (Katia 
Yannaca-Small ed., 2010).  
38 Unless otherwise noted, the treaty standard in all of the cases discussed here was the FVDE, 
so differences in treaty language do not account for the different approaches to remedies. 
39 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 118 (Aug. 30, 2000). 
40 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/98/4, para. 118 (Dec. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Wena Hotels]. 
41 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/99/6, paras. 144, 146 (Apr. 12, 2002). 
42 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, paras. 151, 187–88 (May 29, 2003). 
43 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/16, para. 785 (July 29, 2008) [hereinafter Rumeli 
Telekom]. 
44 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/06/1, paras. 121, 156, 159 (Sept. 9, 2009). 
45 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/06/11, para. 707 (Oct. 5, 2012).  
46 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2, para. 681 (Apr. 18, 2013).  
10




Group 2—Lawful/Unlawful Distinction Noted, but Damages the Same as a Legal Matter: In 
other cases, tribunals noted the distinction but found that it did not, as a matter of law, have 
an effect on damages. In general, these cases found the customary international law standard 
to be the same as the treaty standard and awarded FVDE. Notable among these are: CME v. 
Czech Republic (2001–03);49 Gemplus and Talsud v. Mexico (2010);50 Unglaube v. Costa 
Rica (2012);51 Guaracachi v. Bolivia (2014);52 British Caribbean Bank v. Belize (2014);53 
and Rusoro Mining v. Venezuela.54   
  
Group 3—Lawful/Unlawful Distinction Noted, but Treaty Formula Used Due to Special 
Facts: In a third set of cases, tribunals accepted that lawful versus unlawful expropriations 
would produce different damages; but they did not rely on the distinction in the award due to 
the specific traits of the investment. Key cases include: Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe (2009);55 
Siag and Vecchi v. Egypt (2009);56 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia (2010);57 Houben v. Burundi 
(2016);58 Crystallex International v. Venezuela;59 and Vestey Group v. Venezuela.60  
                                                                                                                                                       
47  <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/04/4, para. 85 (Mar. 22, 2014). See also Alpha 
Projektholding v. Ukraine, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/07/16, paras. 481–93 (Nov. 8, 2010); 
Goetz v. Burundi, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/01/2, para. 295 (June 21, 2012) (both endorsing 
FVDE without mention of a treaty standard); Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. 
ARB/96/1, paras. 78–84 (Feb. 17, 2000) (endorsing FVDE but no IIA governing dispute). 
48 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/11/26, paras. 512–17 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Tenaris]. 
49 <8>UNCITRAL<8>, Partial Award, paras. 615–16 (Sept. 13, 2001); Final Award, paras. 
494–508 (Mar. 14, 2003) (treaty standard of “just compensation” is amount under customary 
law, which was FVDE).  
50 <8>ICSID<8> Case Nos. ARB(AF)/04/3 and 04/4, paras. 8-25, 12-43, 12-53, 13-93 (June 
16, 2010) (treaty standard a “useful guide” for compensation for unlawful expropriations and 
investment valued as of date of expropriation) [hereinafter Unglaube].  
51 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/08/1, paras. 305–18 (May 16, 2012) (treaty and custom 
generally require valuation of asset at highest fair market value).  
52 <8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. 2011-17, paras. 441, 443–44, 613–14 (Jan. 31, 2014) 
(hinting that FVDA might apply in principle). 
53 <8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. 2010-18, paras. 241, 260–61 (Dec. 19, 2014) (BIT’s 
standard of FVDE a lex specialis regardless of whether expropriation was lawful or unlawful, but 
awarding no expropriation damages based on absence of evidence from claimant) [hereinafter 
British Caribbean Bank]. For two cases where the tribunal called the expropriation illegal but 
relied on the treaty without explanation, see OI European Grp. v. Venezuela, <8>ICSID<8> Case 
No. ARB/11/25, paras. 426, 647 (Mar. 10, 2015); Flughafen Zurich v. Venezuela, <8>ICSID<8> 
Case No. ARB/10/19, paras. 744–47 (Nov. 18, 2014). 
54 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, paras. 639–40, 646 (Aug. 22, 2016). 
55 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/6, paras. 108–23 (Apr. 22, 2009) (using treaty standard 
of “genuine value,” interpreted to be FVDE, because investment had not appreciated since its 
taking).  
56 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/15, paras. 443, 539–41 (June 1, 2009) (using FVDE 
because investors not seeking loss of profits per se) [hereinafter Siag & Vecchi]. 
11
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Group 4—Lawful/Unlawful Distinction Noted, with an Effect on Damages: Finally, in a 
relatively small number of cases, the tribunal has both made a distinction between the two 
types of takings and used that distinction as the lodestar for determining damages. The seven 
cases are: ADC v. Hungary (2006);61 Siemens v. Argentina (2007);62 ConocoPhillips v. 
Venezuela (2013);63 Yukos Universal v. Russia (2014);64 Venezuela Holdings v. Venezuela 
(2014);65 Tidewater v. Venezuela (2015);66 and Quiborax v. Bolivia (2015).67 Of the seven 
                                                                                                                                                       
57 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/18, paras. 514–17 (Mar. 3, 2010) (applying treaty 
standard of FVDE on the grounds that claimants would have sold their business at that time). 
58 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/13/7, paras. 219–26, 236–39 (Jan. 12, 2016) (using FVDE 
because claimant could not prove consequential damages or an increase in value of the 
investment). 
59 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, paras. 841-53 (Apr. 4, 2016) (applying FVDE 
because parties agree on valuation date). 
60 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/06/4, paras. 329–31, 350, 437–40 (Apr. 15, 2016) (applying 
FVDE because parties agree on valuation date) [hereinafter Vestey].  
61 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/03/16, paras. 426–44, 481, 483–99 (Oct. 2, 2006) (finding 
BIT violation an “unlawful expropriation,” applying Chorzów Factory, and calculating damages 
based on FVDA) [hereinafter ADC]. On the difference in the award from using FVDA, see 
Valasek, supra note 23. 
62 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/02/8, paras. 349, 352, 360 (Feb. 6, 2007) (breach of BIT 
renders expropriation “unlawful,” requiring payment of FVDA plus consequential damages, but 
basing FVDA on book value as of date of expropriation) [hereinafter Siemens]. 
63 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/07/30, paras. 342–43, 362, 401 (Sept. 3, 2013) (BIT’s 
compensation criterion requires only that host state negotiate with investor in good faith over 
compensation, but concluding that Venezuela had failed to do so, leading to an unlawful 
expropriation and damages based on FVDA) [hereinafter ConocoPhillips]. The tribunal has not 
issued an award on the quantum due to attempts by Venezuela to remove two arbitrators.  
64 Yukos, supra note 6, paras. 1581–85, 1758–69, 1826–27 (breach of Energy Charter Treaty 
an “unlawful expropriation,” triggering Chorzów Factory and the Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, and allowing claimant to choose between FVDE and 
FVDA).  
65 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB 07/27, paras. 301–06 (Oct. 9, 2014) (expropriation did not 
violate BIT requirement of “just compensation” because state had made a serious proposal to the 
investor for compensation, and awarding FVDE, also specified in the BIT); annulled, Mar. 9, 
2017 [hereinafter Venezuela Holdings].  
66 <8>ICSID<8> Case. No. ARB/10/5, paras. 140–46, 159–63 (Mar. 13, 2015) (holding that 
“an expropriation only wanting fair compensation has to be considered as a provisionally lawful 
expropriation,” which was the case here because Venezuelan law required state to pay investor 
only book value, and calculating damages based on BIT’s standard of FVDE) [hereinafter 
Tidewater].  
67 Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 240–55, 325–30, 343–47, 370–85 (BIT violation triggers 
remedy under Chorzów Factory and the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, interpreted as FVDA).  
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cases, the tribunal found the action unlawful in five cases—ADC, Siemens, ConocoPhillips, 
Yukos, and Quiborax—and lawful in two—Venezuela Holdings and Tidewater.  
  
 The modern IIA cases thus evidence a significant range of approaches to the use of 
internal versus external standards regarding compensation for expropriation and the relevance of 
the lawful/unlawful distinction. Nonetheless, most tribunals distinguish between a lawful and 
unlawful expropriation, and those tribunals doing so equate “unlawful” with an expropriation in 
violation of the IIA’s criteria. The other uses suggested in the earlier case law (e.g., a violation of 
custom, or a contract) have faded. Still, most tribunals are awarding the treaty formula of FVDE 
for expropriations in violation of the IIA—either without explanation (Group 1); because they 
believe that that amount is also the amount due for an expropriation in violation of the treaty 
(Group 2); or because the facts of the case make FVDE the most sensible award level, in 
particular because the asset has not increased in value since the taking (Group 3).68 Only three 
cases—ADC, Yukos, and Quiborax—have used the distinction to award a higher degree of 
damages than FVDE, i.e., FVDA or something like it.69  
 One important wrinkle in these cases is that when tribunals purport to apply FVDE, they 
are not consistent in whether they are using only information available at the date of the 
expropriation or information that has become available since that time, in particular when they 
are calculating the DCF of the investment.70 Though DCFs based on both available and ex post 
information are still discounted back to the date of expropriation in calculating FVDE, those 
numbers can differ if market conditions change unpredictably after the expropriation. Full value 
on the date of expropriation using ex post information has been endorsed as early as Amco Asia 
v. Indonesia71 (which did not concern an IIA) and as recently at Quiborax.72 Both cases 
considered that amount to be the quantum of damages required for unlawful acts as a matter of 
customary international law. However, sometimes tribunals seem to rely on ex ante information 
for some inputs and ex post information for other inputs into FVDE.73 Academic and other 
                                                
68 I appreciate Charles Brower’s point in this regard. See also the summary of the case law in 
<8>UNCTAD<8>, EXPROPRIATION: A SEQUEL, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, at 114–16 (2011). 
69 See Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 54–56 (Stern, dissenting). As noted, an award on 
quantum has not been issued in ConocoPhillips. In Tenaris, supra note 48, paras. 542–49, the 
tribunal suggested that part of its valuation of certain side companies was based on Chorzów 
Factory and not merely the treaty.  
70 DCF is not always used, whether because an asset is no longer performing or because a 
tribunal regards data on cash flow as too contingent, in which case other methods to determine 
fair market value (e.g., share prices) are used. 
71 <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/81/1, paras. 613–14 (Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter Amco 
Asia].  
72 Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 379–85. For other examples, see Christina L. Beharry, 
Lawful Versus Unlawful Expropriation: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose, in INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (Ian A. Laird, Borzu Sabahi, Frédéric G. Sourgens 
& Todd J. Weiler eds., 2016).  
73 See Quiborax, supra note 1, (Stern, dissenting).  
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commentaries differ on whether ex post information can be considered for purposes of 
determining FVDE.74 I will return to this point in Part III.A.  
 
C. European Court of Human Rights 
 
 A number of IIA tribunals have supported their distinctions between lawful and unlawful 
expropriations, with the consequences for damages, by reference to European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence. The precedent sometimes cited is Papamichalopoulos v. Greece 
(1995), where the Court, having previously found that the Greek military government’s taking of 
the applicant’s beachfront property was a violation of Protocol I, labeled the dispossession 
“unlawful.” It then invoked Chorzów Factory and ordered Greece either to provide restitution or 
to pay the current value of the land and buildings (i.e., the FVDA), as well as nonpecuniary 
damages for mental suffering.75 
However, in Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy (2009), the Court, via the Grand Chamber, changed 
course significantly, ruling that when the state had definitively taken a claimant’s property in the 
public interest such that she no longer had title to it, it need only pay the value as of the date of 
the expropriation (plus interest).76 The ruling suggested that some expropriations that violate 
Protocol I are worse than others, though it is hard to see how exactly it fits into the 
lawful/unlawful distinction. 77  Investment tribunals do not, however, seem to have made 
reference to this case.78  
 
D. A Brief Word on Academic Commentary  
 
 Contemporary academic treatments still make reference to the lawful/unlawful distinction 
as key to the determination of damages. Thus, the Dolzer/Schreuer volume and de Nanteuil’s 
recent treatise restate the four criteria above as rules of customary international law, qualify any 
                                                
74  Compare IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 237 (2009) and William C. Lieblich, Determining the 
Economic Value of Expropriated Income-Producing Property in International Arbitrations, 8 J. 
INT’L ARB. 59, 72 (1991) with Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 109–18.  
75 Papamichalopoulos v. Greece (Article 50), App. No. 14556/89, 21 EHRR 439, paras. 36–
40 (1996). For cases citing it, see, e.g., Tidewater, supra note 66, at n. 218, and ADC, supra note 
61, para. 497. The European Court of Human Rights has cited the case in some judgments under 
Protocol I—particularly those involving land or other physical assets—for the proposition that 
the state must provide restitution, or, failing that, FVDA plus nonpecuniary damages. Velcheva v. 
Bulgaria, App. No. 35355/08, [2015] ECHR 552, para. 56 (2015); Borzhonov v. Russia, App. 
No. 1827/04, ECHR, para. 69 (2009); Brumarescu v. Romania, App. No. 28342/95, [1999] 
ECHR 105, para. 20 (2001). 
76 Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy (Just Satisfaction), App. No. 58858/00, ECHR, paras. 102–07 
(2009).  
77 See OCTAVIAN ICHIM, JUST SATISFACTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 102–05 (2014). Unlike Ichim, I interpret Guiso-Gallisay as restoring somewhat the 
distinctions among expropriations based on the way they are carried out.  
78 It is not listed as an ECHR case cited by tribunals in the www.investorstatelawguide.com 
database, as of publication date. 
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violation of those standards as an illegal expropriation, and call for recourse to the rules of state 
responsibility for such acts, which may lead to damages different from the value of the asset at 
the time of the taking.79 Both the latter and Marboe’s impressive book also distinguish between 
compensation for a lawful expropriation with damages (indemnisation) for an unlawful act.80 
Sornorajah agrees that takings must be for a public purpose and nondiscriminatory to be legal, 
but he does not seem to consider the mere nonpayment of compensation—even in violation of a 
treaty—to render the expropriation unlawful; and he calls for payment in those cases to be the 
amount in the treaty.81 
 
E. Crystallizing the Shortcomings in the Case Law 
 
 This overview reveals contrasting understandings as to what makes an expropriation legal 
or illegal as well as a multiplicity of approaches to the damages that follow. For some tribunals, 
the distinction is not mentioned. For scholars and tribunals that do note it, an expropriation could 
be unlawful due to a breach of a contract, local law, customary law, or an IIA (the usage most 
common among tribunals today). If it is unlawful, the remedy still might be based on the 
standard in the treaty, i.e., FVDE, or on customary international law. If it is the customary law 
standard, it might mean FVDA, FVDE, or something else, which may or may not incorporate 
information not known at the time of the expropriation.  
 The practice and case law makes clear that every expropriation differs in terms of the 
method used and the impact on the investor; and every investment differs in terms of the best 
economic way of valuing it.82 And not all treaties use identical language to describe the required 
compensation, although the use of FVDE is overall quite consistent. The problem for the law is 
that this diversity of expropriations does not map onto the diversity of legal approaches to 
remedies. There is no fit between the often-irreconcilable principles in the case law and the 
actions of the states, including their impact on foreign investors. The combination of 
                                                
79 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 99–100 (2d ed. 2012); ARNAUD DE NANTEUIL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE 
L’INVESTISSEMENT 342–47 (2014) 
80 See DE NANTEUIL, supra note 79, at 347–48; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 75–79. I will use 
the terms interchangeably in this piece. See also SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, 
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 66, 86–88 (2008). For an argument that the BIT 
standard is close to that of customary law for unlawful takings, see Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral 
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251, 
396 (1997). 
81 MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNORAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
406–10 (3d ed. 2010). See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 624–25 (8th ed. 2012) (finding most expropriations “unlawful only. . . if 
appropriate compensation is not provided for,” but some (e.g., discriminatory takings) unlawful 
per se, but then endorsing AIF’s, supra note 26, economically flawed view on damage 
calculations). 
82 See Henry Weisberg & Christopher Ryan, Means to Be Made Whole: Damages in the 
Context of International Investment Arbitration, in EVALUATION OF DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 165, 169–70 (Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler eds., 2006).  
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inconsistency and conceptual lack of clarity means that the case law does not provide legal 
guidance to participants in the foreign investment process. 
 The current approaches to remedies thus have a terminological and a substantive element. 
As a terminological matter, Chorzów Factory (and, to a lesser extent, the competing opinions in 
Amoco International Finance) still exerts a pull on some tribunals to characterize expropriations 
as lawful or unlawful, even if they do not use that distinction to determine damages. Tribunals 
seem to use the terms out of a sense of inertia, even though the only questions typically before a 
tribunal are: (a) whether an expropriation has taken place; (b) whether it met the criteria in the 
IIA; and (c) if not, the amount due for the treaty violation.  
 The terminological confusion has a fairly simple solution. Tribunals deciding 
expropriation claims under IIAs should describe expropriations as either treaty-compliant or 
treaty-violative. Whether the expropriation is unlawful in any other sense is not relevant for its 
consistency with the expropriation requirements of an IIA (except possibly to the extent that 
interpretation of some of the process conditions for expropriation may take account of customary 
international law). This terminology will avoid the incoherence of saying, for instance, that a 
violation of any of the first three (process-based) criteria of an IIA is an unlawful act while a 
violation of the fourth (payment) criterion alone is a lawful act.  
 Many tribunals use the term unlawful in this narrow sense of a treaty violation, so the 
term could be salvaged. But the alternative will also dispel misgivings by developing states that 
international law somehow questions their sovereign right to expropriate.83 By avoiding the 
moniker of “unlawful” in favor of treaty-violative, tribunals will be sending a clearer message 
that the state’s right to expropriate is not at issue, but only whether the exercise of that right was 
conformity with treaties to which it is a party.84  
 But a terminological fix will not solve the more fundamental disagreement over the 
proper remedy for a violation of the criteria for a treaty-compliant expropriation. That dispute 
raises questions such as whether some violations of IIAs are worse than others; whether IIAs 
provide a lex specialis for remedies and thus the scope of the default rules of state responsibility; 
and how we ought best to monetize the damages for an expropriation.  
 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVISING REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
 
A. Doctrinal Constraints? 
 
 International law does not offer one obvious doctrinal solution to the problem presented 
here. Certainly, as a matter of customary international law, a breach of a legal obligation triggers 
duties by the violator, which the ASRs have identified as including cessation and nonrepetition, 
along with full reparation. The ASRs define the latter as restitution if possible (and not an undue 
                                                
83 A right that is beyond question. See, e.g., GA Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962). 
84 The terminology might have relevance in situations not covered by an investment treaty, 
e.g., where the investor or its home state bases its claims on custom (perhaps if an insurance 
contract only covers unlawful expropriations); or in interpreting other clauses of IIAs, e.g., an 
umbrella clause (where illegality for breach of a contract can be a treaty violation) or fair and 
equitable treatment (where the tribunal may have recourse to customary international law). 
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burden on the violating state) or, otherwise, compensation “for the damage caused” (meaning 
“financially assessable damage including loss of profits”).85  
 But the ASRs do not provide enough guidance for investor-state tribunals for two 
reasons. First, ASR Article 33 makes clear that the obligations of the responsible state, including 
that regarding reparation, apply only to other states, and are “without prejudice to any right” 
enjoyed by a nonstate actor, such as a foreign investor. The tribunal in Wintershall 
Aktiengesellaschaft v. Argentina recognized this limitation in interpreting the jurisdictional 
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina bilateral investment treaty (BIT).86 Zachary Douglas has 
interpreted this provision, as well as parts of Chorzów Factory, as suggesting that certain forms 
of reparation are unique to the interstate context and that <10>ICSID<10> tribunals, which 
address what he calls “the vindication of private interests,” may not have the authority to award 
the same damages to an investor as a state would receive.87 Brigitte Stern makes a related point 
that reparation can benefit only state interests and “perhaps private individuals,” a position she 
grounds in human rights law.88  
 Wintershall’s, Douglas’s, and Stern’s views on the inapplicability of Chorzów Factory 
and the ASRs regarding the consequences of breach—including the duty of full reparation—to 
the violation of investor rights have other arguments in their favor. For one, full reparation might 
not adequately reflect the current political economy of investor-state relations, where investors 
who sue might well be very sophisticated in terms of what they should have known about the 
possibility of expropriation; and states may strain to provide full compensation in the event of 
expropriations carried out in the national interest. I will return to this point in Part III below.  
 I need not decide whether all the ASR rules on consequences of a breach are inapplicable 
to investor-state arbitration. At a minimum, Article 33 leaves open the possibility that rules 
requiring full reparation might not apply to investors and affirms that if international investment 
law provides a lex specialis, then that law would prevail.89 Article 55 confirms that the ASRs do 
not apply if a lex specialis governs a state’s responsibility. So, it is certainly possible for 
international investment law to have its own rules on consequences of a treaty breach, including 
recourse to the treaty standard for the quantum of damages.90  
                                                
85 Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
Arts. 30–31, 35–36, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ASRs]. 
86 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/04/14, para. 
113 (Dec. 8, 2008) (ASRs “contain[] no rules and regulations of State Responsibility vis-à-vis 
non-State actors.”).  
87  Zachary Douglas, Other Specific Regimes of Responsibility: Investment Treaty 
Arbitrations and <8>ICSID<8>, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 815, 829 
(James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010); see also Zachary Douglas, The 
Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 183. For a critique, 
see CHARLES LEBEN, THE ADVANCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 54–61 (2010). 
88 Brigitte Stern, The Obligation to Make Reparation, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 87, at 563, 567. But see Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and the (New) Law of State Responsibility, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 635–40 (2013) 
(offering arguments for extending ASR rules to investor-state disputes). 
89 ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 33 comm. 
90 See Vestey, supra note 60, paras. 327–29 (acknowledging this possibility). 
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 Second, even if a tribunal decides to use the ASRs to determine damages, the concept of 
compensation “for the damage caused,” or Chorzów Factory’s “wiping out all the 
consequences,” is open to significant interpretation and does not point to a single answer 
regarding the date of valuation or the inclusion of other losses.  
 The result is three significant gaps in the case law and doctrine. It does not tell us: (a) 
whether international investment law has a lex specialis regarding damages for expropriations; 
(b) if so, what that lex specialis might require in terms of the quantum of compensation; and (c) 
if not, what “full reparation” means in the context of different sorts of expropriations.  
 
B. Toward a Coherent Framework  
 
 One response to these gaps might be to leave things as they are on the understanding that 
investor-state tribunals’ principal duty is to solve a dispute between two parties rather than 
develop any—or much—coherent case law. The origin of IIA-based arbitration in international 
commercial arbitration might support such a conclusion. Thomas Schultz has argued against 
consistency on the grounds that it can freeze bad law in place.91 Critiques of consistent legal 
reasoning across cases raise many questions beyond the scope of this essay; but for my purposes 
two brief, modest responses will suffice. 
 First, the various actors in the foreign investment process will benefit from some 
predictability from arbitral awards. In considering whether to conclude an IIA, a host state will 
understand what it is accepting if tribunals treat similar words in similar IIAs similarly. In case 
of a dispute between an investor and a host state, if the parties see how tribunals have handled 
cases using similar treaties, they will have a better sense of the strength of their claims and the 
desirability of settlement. Lawyers in disputes will, or at least should, be able to avoid 
relitigating settled issues. Other interest groups, whether labor unions or environmental activists, 
will also be able to make more coherent and persuasive claims. Arbitration itself will have more 
credibility if the damage award is grounded more firmly in legal principles and not seen as just 
picking a number between those offered by the parties. This sort of minimalist consistency, as 
opposed to an arbitral free-for-all, is essential to any rules-based system.92 
 Second, we must acknowledge that international investment law has many attributes of a 
public law system. Although the public/private divide is both overrated and fuzzy, it remains the 
case that, given the stakes for host states—the key repeat players—in adjusting national policies 
to IIA standards and in devoting significant resources to pay damages, the need for some 
predictability on key interpretive issues is essential.93 Even if—indeed, especially if—one favors 
retention of decentralized, party-controlled arbitration, investment law has become an area where 
stakeholders deserve some coherence in the law. More consistency will not allay many other 
                                                
91 Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 297 (Zachary Douglas, 
Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014). 
92  See Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State 
Arbitration: On Consistency, Coherence, and the Identification of Applicable Law, in THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 91, at 257, 269–75.  
93 See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 
(2008). For an endorsement of some but not all of this characterization, see José E. Alvarez, Is 
Investor-State Arbitration “Public”?, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 534 (2016). 
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concerns of host states, e.g., the scope of IIA clauses on fair and equitable treatment, but it can 
contribute to a system with more acceptability from the key stakeholders.  
 If some improvement in the status quo is normatively desirable, one obvious doctrinal 
recourse would be to deploy principles of treaty interpretation in the hope that each IIA will 
reveal its own set of remedies for breach; or perhaps a common set of remedies will emerge for 
similarly worded clauses. The practice of states in response to treaty-violative expropriations 
when there is no arbitration, or the travaux préparatoires, might reveal a treaty-specific, regime-
specific, or even a customary law remedy.  
 Although such an inquiry might yield some holy grail of remedies, it seems extremely 
doubtful. As for state practice under a treaty, states are unlikely to admit IIA violations if they do 
eventually pay compensation to investors, thus making it impossible to know whether the 
compensation paid “establishes the agreement of the parties”94—i.e., of the host state and the 
investor’s state as to the meaning of the treaty. And for the same reason, any compensation paid 
would be without opinio juris for purposes of customary law. Indeed, these same interpretive 
disputes arose over the relevance of ad hoc or lump sum settlements to the customary law 
standard of compensation.95 We can look to judicial opinions and the views of publicists, but 
those are very source of the confusion. 
 With the case law inconsistent, the doctrine incomplete, and traditional methods of 
interpretation unhelpful, development of a framework for remedies could proceed from one of 
two bases. One, purely deductive and indeed philosophical, would seek to ground remedies in 
the theories of property, torts, contracts, remedies, and related matters, including global justice—
for indeed all are relevant to expropriation. No doubt the ground is fertile for this sort of 
research.  
 The other, and the one I adopt here, is to focus on actual community expectations about 
remedies.96 That inquiry does not entail a search for an extant, agreed formula for remedies, 
because both the case law and state practice demonstrate that we do not yet have one. Instead, 
my theory looks for community expectations at the next level up, identifying the goals that 
decision-makers agree should be served by the remedies to investors for treaty-violative 
expropriations. Only if we understand the policy behind, and the point of, those remedies, rather 
than merely recite the “wipe out all the consequences” mantra, can we begin to have a sense as to 
what kinds of takings merit what kinds of payment.97 The result will be a framework for future 
arbitral decision making, as well as treaty-drafting. I hesitate to use the word doctrine for it 
suggests a rigidity and formulaic approach to resolving a highly complex set of decisions by 
                                                
94 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
95 See, e.g., Sedco, supra note 25, at 184–89. 
96 See Higgins, supra note 19, at 321; MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, The 
Prescribing Function in the World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 355, 368 (1981). 
97 For an examination of the goals of remedies for human rights violations, see Szilvia 
Altwicker-Hámori, Tilmann Altwicker & Anne Peters, Measuring Violations of Human Rights: 
An Empirical Analysis of Awards in Respect of Non-pecuniary Damages Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 76 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND 
VÖLKERRECHT 1, 10–12 (2016). For a critical work developing the concept of sanctioning goals, 
see RICHARD ARENS & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER: THE EMERGING 
FIELD OF SANCTION LAW 198–203 (1961). 
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states, investors, and tribunals. Doctrine is what got us into this mess in the first place. So, while 
I aim for coherence and consistency, the model I propose can guarantee neither.  
 
C. Purposes of Remedies for Treaty-Violative Expropriations 
 
 In my view, we can identify five goals of remedies as generally accepted by decision-
makers in and observers of the process of legal regulation of foreign investment.98 Decision-
makers might differ on how those goals should be operationalized, but I think the goals 
themselves are generally shared. Although they are not set out in any one document, case law 
and other discourse in the international investment community help us identify them. Beyond 
these five purposes, four goals are more controversial and contested. 
 
1. Repairing the Damage to the Expropriated Investor  
 
 The first, and perhaps primary, purpose of a remedy for treaty-violative expropriations, or 
indeed compensation for any expropriations, is focused on the interests of, and losses to, the 
target of the taking. Whether or not the state was justified according to the relevant law 
(domestic or international), the investor has typically experienced a financial loss from the taking 
of its property. Seen from the perspective of property or tort theory or basic notions of justice, 
restitution or compensation is ordinarily due.99 Payment might be a redress for an illegitimate 
transfer or a means of legitimating it ex ante; but either way, the goal of payment is to offset or 
eliminate the loss the target of the taking has suffered.100 A remedy may also need to repair 
consequential harms associated with the property loss, such as the cost of abandoning the 
investment or even the costs of contesting the expropriation in court. This goal of repairing the 
loss does not equate with a guarantee of compensation—e.g., the investor may not deserve it for 
other reasons (such as, contributory fault), the investment may be worthless, or the state may 
have overriding interests that justify nonpayment—but the restorative function is central to a 
remedy.  
                                                
98 For a set of complementary goals of investor-state arbitration generally, see Sergio Puig, 
No Right Without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 91, at 235, 243–48. See also Anne van Aaken, 
Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Political Economy Analysis, in DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 158–61 (André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds., 
2015) (contrasting instrumental and noninstrumental goals). 
99 Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 752, 798 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Jules Coleman, 
Scott Hershovitz & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of the Common Law of Torts, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, sec. 3.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), at 
https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=tort-theories; Joel Feinberg, 
Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 93, 102 (1978).  
100 Coleman & Kraus, supra note 4, at 1337. 
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  The harm to the investor from a treaty-violative expropriation might be greater than the 
harm from a treaty-compliant expropriation.101 If the investor is denied some due process, or not 
paid on time or at all, it may experience additional harms beyond the loss of the property. These 
include the inability to invest the proceeds due the investor under a treaty-compliant 
expropriation or even mental harm (in the case of individuals) from abandoning the investment 
in an unpredictable way. So, remedies need to take into account any additional harm cause by a 
treaty-violative expropriation. 
 Despite differences among states over the precise amount an investor should be paid, the 
foreign investment law regime clearly recognizes this investor-oriented goal for remedies.102 The 
duty in countless IIAs on the state to compensate the investor—not its home state—in an amount 
equal to the FVDE is a recognition of the goal of repairing the harm to investors from all 
expropriations. Indeed, this goal is at the core of most international law approaches to remedies. 
Thus, the debates within both jurisprudence and the case law over remedies are focused on the 
question of what was really lost to the investor and how much compensation can repair that 
harm. And it is at the center of debates between arbitrators, whether in the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal or as recently as Quiborax, often using Chorzów Factory as a sort of trope.  
 Yet despite this emphasis on repairing the harm to investors, remedies serve other goals 
as well. While often not explicit in the case law (perhaps because arbitrators may see the 
elaboration of such considerations as ultra vires), these other goals are part of the community’s 
expectations on remedies and must guide our choices.  
 
 2. Putting the Correct Incentives on Host States 
 
 A remedy for treaty-violative expropriations also serves a function oriented toward the 
taker, rather than the taken, one centered on placing certain incentives on host states.103 It puts an 
incentive on the state to follow the IIA’s criteria when it does want to expropriate. Tribunals do 
not speak in terms of incentives,104 but it is clear that state responsibility for treaty violations, 
including damages, aims at providing them.105 Scholars have offered various theories for why 
states comply with legal obligations, whether in response to internal dynamics or external 
relations with other states. But it does not take a particularly imaginative theory to conclude that 
                                                
101 I am not assuming that the compensation paid in a treaty-compliant expropriation, i.e., 
FVDE, eliminates the harm to the investor, as the investor may value the investment more than 
the FVDE.  
102  See, e.g., José Enrique Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing 
International Investment, 344 RECUEIL DES COURS 54, 193, 231–32 (2011) (“the point is to make 
claimants whole for their losses”); Puig, supra note 98, at 245, 252 (“corrective” rationale); van 
Aaken, supra note 98, at 160.  
103 Indeed, the requirement in IIAs that the state pay for expropriation deters the taking of 
private property in the first place, just as the lack of such a requirement for bona fide regulations 
of a nonexpropriatory character signals that such measures are permissible (although the risk of 
an FET violation can interfere with this signal).  
104 For a suggestion that the purpose of the IIA expropriation provisions is to channel takings 
into particular methods, see Siag & Vecchi, supra note 56, para. 428. 
105 See van Aaken, supra note 98, at 159–61 (noting also that absence of fault requirement 
serves a deterrence function).  
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a duty to pay compensation for a treaty-violative expropriation, assuming it can be enforced, can 
affect state incentives to violate the treaty.  
 Moreover, it would also seem that to place the proper incentive on the state to comply 
with the treaty, the damages for treaty-violative expropriations should exceed the compensation 
for treaty-compliant expropriations; for otherwise the state would see no interest in complying. 
But, in fact, we cannot be sure, if only because states have other reasons—in particular 
reputational—to comply with IIAs than additional financial loss for noncompliance.106 Whether 
damages for the former must exceed the compensation for the latter in order to incentivize states 
to follow an IIA is ultimately an empirical question.107 (I will leave aside the broader question of 
whether an IIA, or compliance with it, promotes foreign investment, on which views differ 
greatly.)  
 Moreover, as economists have pointed out, goals (1) and (2) can sometimes conflict. 
Some remedies aimed at providing compensation to the target of a treaty-violative taking can 
over-deter, i.e., deter not merely violations but desirable conduct, by causing states to refrain 
from economically useful or efficient expropriations for fear of big payouts.108 It could also 
cause states to pull out of IIAs or <10>ICSID<10> or to ignore awards, anecdotal evidence of 
which can already be seen in the reactions of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Russia to adverse 
rulings in investor-state arbitration.  
 
3. The Expressive Purpose of a Remedy 
 
 Legal remedies can also serve an expressive function, a goal well accepted for domestic 
criminal law, but which is not limited to either criminal punishment or the domestic sphere.109 A 
remedy can express a societal view about the importance of the underlying legal norm, often a 
prohibition. But it can also express the efficacy of law itself, which seems critical in the case of 
international investment law. Remedies for treaty-violative expropriations send a signal to states, 
investors, and other actors in the foreign investment process that violations of treaties will not go 
unnoticed—that the law is, in a broad sense, operational and not merely a paper tiger.110 Thus, 
beyond the effect of compensation on the investor or the state, the meting out of consequences 
serves an independent goal, one that is essential to the integrity of the legal system. It is a 
                                                
106 See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMÁN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 71–117 (2008). 
107 The state’s prediction regarding whether the foreign investor will sue in response to a 
treaty violation will also affect incentives. See JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 91–93 (2011).  
108 Id. at 100–01; see also Louis T. Wells, Double-Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An 
Economist Questions Damages Awarded to Karaha Bodas Company in Indonesia, 19 ARB. INT’L 
471, 478 (2003); van Aaken, supra note 98, at 184, 186. High damage awards can also send 
economically inefficient signals to investors, as noted infra note 131. 
109 See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970). On such theories in 
constitutional law, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: 
A Restatement, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 1503 (2000). On international criminal law, see MARK 
DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).  
110 See Puig, supra note 98, at 235.  
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profound expression of what the policy-oriented approach to international law calls “control.”111 
This idea extends to many other contexts. For instance, if a state is required to pay dues to an 
international organization and pays them late, loss by the state of its vote in the institution’s 
constituent assembly is more expressive of the law’s efficacy than a requirement that it pay 
interest on a late payment.112  
 Though the term may originate in American legal philosophy, the expressive purpose of a 
remedy is suffused into international jurisprudence. Recall that the PCIJ in Chorzów Factory said 
that it would be “unjust” for Poland to pay the same amount for expropriating German assets in 
violation of the 1922 treaty as it would if expropriation had been allowed under the treaty.113 
Although morally the point makes little sense (is it really unjust in a philosophical sense?), the 
Court seems to be suggesting that violations of treaties, if unaddressed through remedies tailored 
to the violation, are threats to the possibility of law as a constraint on state action. In the Tehran 
Hostages Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made a similar move in highlighting the 
consequences of continued flouting of both the Court’s orders and the underlying diplomatic 
law.114 
 
4. Maintaining the Viability of the International Legal Regime on Foreign Investment 
 
 Remedies also need to advance the broader goals of the regime of which they are a part. 
This goal for remedies starts with a doctrinal premise—that remedies for breaches of the treaty 
should generally reflect the object and purpose of the treaty. This point has been recognized, 
albeit obliquely, by the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo and Fisheries Jurisdiction cases.115 It also flows 
from the interaction of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and customary 
international law. Article 31 of the VCLT commands that interpreters of a treaty take into 
account its object and purpose. Because identification of a breach requires interpretation of the 
treaty, when a decision-maker classifies an act as a breach of a treaty, he or she will typically 
                                                
111 See MCDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 96, at 377–78.  
112 See UN Charter, Art. 19. As evidence of the unwillingness of the UN’s member states to 
enforce that sanction, see Rep. of the Comm. on Contributions, Seventy-First Session, UN Doc. 
A/71/11 (2016).  
113 See Chorzów Factory, supra note 5, at 47.  
114 U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ Rep. 3, paras. 91–92 
(May 24). The ASRs confusingly suggest that only cessation of unlawful activities serves this 
function and compensation is not mean to serve an expressive function; rather, only the remedy 
of satisfaction, can achieve that goal. ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 30, comm. para. 5; Art. 36, 
comm. para. 4; Art. 37, comm. para. 3. But this position represents a narrow understanding of the 
expressive function of a remedy. Indeed, restitution or payment of compensation in many ways 
offers a far stronger validation of legal rules than an expression of regret. 
115 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 ICJ Rep. 7, paras. 141–42, 150 
(Sept. 25) (ordering parties to resume cooperation “that takes account of the objectives of the 
Treaty”); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 ICJ Rep. 3, para. 78 (July 25) (directing 
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take into account the object and purpose of the treaty (except perhaps in the case of some very 
obvious facial violation).116  
 Now consider the implications of this conclusion for remedies. First, assume that the 
consequences of the breach arise under custom alone, with its overall requirement as one of “full 
reparation,” or “wiping out all the consequences” of the breach. If the identification of the breach 
requires considering the treaty’s object and purpose, then so should the identification of the 
remedy that will eliminate the consequences of the breach. Second, assume that the 
consequences of breaches arise under a lex specialis unique to that treaty. In that case, certainly 
that lex specialis must reflect the treaty’s object and purpose just as the underlying primary 
obligations do.117 Either way, tribunals should devise remedies that respect a treaty’s object and 
purpose. 
 In the case of IIAs, each treaty differs in its combination of investor rights and host state 
prerogatives. Yet, when viewed as a whole, the corpus of IIAs does share the purpose of creating 
a broadly accepted international legal regime on foreign investment. The proliferation of 
substantially similar bilateral and multilateral investment treaties suggests that most governments 
agree that some regulation of foreign investment is useful for promoting economic welfare in the 
host state. At the same time, the content of that regulation has changed over time, as the relative 
economic and political power of host states, home states, investors, and nonstate actors has 
changed.118 Just as the underlying rules reflect that political economy, so should the remedies for 
their violation. If they do not, some participants will decide they do not want to be part of that 
legal regulation, and the regime will unravel.  
 In particular, to maintain the viability of the regime, the remedies, like the rules, must 
take account of the profound changes in the regime since Chorzów Factory or TOPCO. We are 
no longer in a world in which the point of foreign investment law is to protect Northern investors 
against Southern host states. Rather, IIAs strike a balance between host state prerogatives and 
investor interests whose ultimate aim is the economic advancement of the host states.119 
Contemporary IIAs and free trade agreements reflect a greater deference to host state concerns, 
as seen in the definitions of expropriation and fair and equitable treatment, and the exclusion of 
                                                
116 See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan, N.Z. intervening), 2014 ICJ Rep. 226, 
paras. 55–58 (Mar. 31); ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 12, comm. para. 1. 
117 See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 97–
102 (2d ed. 2005) (linking remedies to unique nature of human rights treaties). See also Chorzów 
Factory, supra note 5, at 47 (noting “aim of . . . the Convention” as preserving the property 
rights of Germans in Poland). Cf. Audley Sheppard, The Distinction Between Lawful and 
Unlawful Expropriation, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 169, 
184 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006) (noting complete prohibition on expropriation in Chorzów 
Factory’s scenario).  
118 For a review of those changes, see generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). 
119 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, draft agreement, Feb. 1, 2016, pmbl. (goal to “strengthen their economic, trade, and 
investment relations in accordance with the objective of sustainable development” and “raise 
living standards, promote economic growth and stability, create new employment opportunities 
and improve the general welfare . . .”) [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA]. 
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certain domestic regulation from arbitration. 120  When tribunals find expropriations, their 
approach to a remedy should respect the same balance or dynamic reflected in these treaties. This 
goal does not point to one solution regarding remedies for treaty-violative expropriations; but it 
suggests that any alternative to the status quo in the case law must take account of the interests, 
power, wealth, knowledge, and other features of the participants in the foreign investment 
process. 
 Some tribunals seem to have recognized this goal when they speak of interpreting IIAs in 
a “balanced” way, reflecting both investor and state interests.121 Others have invoked the need to 
take into account the expectations of the community of states regarding investment law, usually 
in the context of explaining their approach to earlier decisions.122 This goal also offers another 
perspective on why tribunals do not award restitution to investors beyond the obvious practical 
difficulties in enforcement (which tribunals obliquely recognize when they talk about the 
impossibility of enforcement of restitution).123 Such a remedy would frustrate a purpose of the 
IIA, which is to preserve the right of states to take foreign property, subject to conditions.  
 It might be questioned whether arbitrators themselves should take such a goal into 
account. In his Freshfields Lecture, Michael Reisman found it generally illegitimate for 
arbitrators to consider systemic goals in their deliberations, both because such considerations are 
not part of their interpretive mandate under the Vienna Convention and because the participants 
in the investment law system lack a shared vision of its goals. He fears that arbitrators will use 
these considerations to sacrifice principled decision-making for political expediency.124 Reisman 
is surely correct that arbitrators have different functions from those who draft treaties or analyze 
cases; their function is more backward-looking than forward-looking.  
 But inclusion of this goal is justified for two reasons with respect to remedies. First, the 
proposals I offer below can be developed in law through alternative means, e.g., new treaties or 
other modes of lawmaking. Second, even if arbitrators end up developing a new approach to 
remedies, systemic considerations are a legitimate consideration when the law has a lacuna, a 
point Reisman notes. This is indeed the case for remedies, where, as discussed above, the law—
the particular IIA and custom—do not provide a clear answer. In those cases, the judge may have 
reference to what Reisman calls “the community’s law and agreed policies,” including “the 
systemic implications of alternative elements of decision.”125 Without exaggerating the degree of 
consensus among participants in the international investment law regime over its goals, the 
arbitrator can certainly consider whether some remedies would undermine confidence in that 
regime more than others.  
 
                                                
120 See, e.g., id., ch. 8.2, Arts. 14, 16, ann. on “Expropriation”; ch. 8.3, Art. 1. 
121 See, e.g., ST-AD GmbH v. Bulgaria, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on Jurisdiction, 
paras. 382–84 (July 18, 2013), and the cases cited therein.  
122 See, e.g., Noble Energy v. Ecuador, <8>ICSID<8> Case. No. ARB/05/12, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, para. 50 (Mar. 5, 2008). 
123 See, e.g., CMS v. Argentina, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 406 (May 12, 
2005) [hereinafter CMS]; ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 35, comm. para. 4. 
124 W. Michael Reisman, ‘Case Specific Mandates’ Versus ‘Systemic Implications’: How 
Should Investment Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB. INT’L 131 
(2013).  
125 Id. at 149–50.  
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5. Ease of Administration 
 
 Lastly, any remedy, whether under customary law or a lex specialis, must be capable of 
administration by the tribunal determining damages. The general refusal to order restitution 
reflects arbitrators’ realization that states will almost certainly not reverse course on something 
as important as an expropriation of foreign property.126 But ease of administration is not just 
about getting the host state to cooperate; it also requires that we develop modes that tribunals can 
implement given the information available to them. Although every award of damages involves 
discretion by the tribunal, the more a remedy requires recourse to a valuation method with highly 
complex, contested, or speculative elements, the more difficult it is for tribunals to determine a 
remedy and then justify it in their award. This challenge is compounded by the wild variations in 
valuations offered to tribunals by party-retained accounting firms.  
 Prediction will often be an element of valuation—it is the essence of the DCF method—
but some predictions are better than others.127 Tribunals already seek to advance this goal when 
they say, as they often do, they will not consider speculative damages, but the line between 
prediction and speculation is not always so clear. 128  Given the need for awards to be 
understandable to the litigators, it is important to keep the arbitrators’ mandate manageable when 
it comes to damage calculations. 
 
D. Other Arguable Goals for Remedies 
 
 One might advance other goals for remedies for treaty-violative expropriation. Four are 
worth brief mention, along with the reasons they are not generally accepted. 
 
1. Economic Efficiency 
 
 Law and economics literature is replete with analyses of the most economically efficient 
remedies for torts, contract breaches, and takings.129 These theories specify the damages or 
                                                
126 See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 87 
(July 25, 2007) (restitution beyond the power of a tribunal); Arif v. Moldova, <8>ICSID<8> 
Case No. ARB/11/23, para. 571 (Apr. 8, 2013); Christine Gray, The Different Forms of 
Reparation: Restitution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 87, at 589, 
595–96.  
127 In addition, if DCF requires that the tribunal consider only information known to the 
parties as of a particular date, then uncertainties arise not merely over prediction, but 
retrospection.  
128 ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 12, comm. para. 1; Art. 36, comm. para. 27; and cites therein. 
For a typical statement by a tribunal, see BG Group Plc. v. Argentina, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, para. 
428 (Dec. 24, 2007). 
129 Of particular relevance to expropriations, see e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981); 
Benjamin Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 64 (1995); 
Thomas S. Ulen, The Public Use of Private Property: A Dual-Constraint Theory of Efficient 
Governmental Takings, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS 
PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 163 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992).  
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compensation that place the right incentives on various parties, spread the risks of harm 
efficiently, or strike the right balance between social costs and private costs; or the amount of 
insurance potential victims will and should purchase to protect against the risk of property 
loss.130 They have had a significant influence on the domestic law and scholarship of tort and 
contract damages. Economic approaches might suggest basing valuation of expropriated property 
on the minimum amount for which the investor would be willing to sell the investment (the 
“reservation price”), the amount for which he would buy insurance on the investment (the 
“implied insurance price”), or some other measure to encourage the state to engage only in 
economically efficient takings.131  
 Yet the case law shows that investment tribunals do not consider economic efficiency in 
the sense advanced by economists. Certainly, tribunals rely on economic concepts such as DCF 
to determine fair market value, and they rely on economic models to estimate future profits or 
prices for assets. But they do not look at incentives, social versus private costs, or other standards 
of economic efficiency. And neither of the dominant views in the case law about damages—i.e., 
FVDE or FVDA—is based on these rationales.  
 Practitioners and scholars of international investment law can lament this situation or 
praise it. Even those who favor an economic approach would then confront competing economic 
theories as to the best choice of damages. The lack of consensus on the desirability of economic 
analysis and its content seems destined to keep efficiency considerations out of the doctrine of 
remedies for IIA violations.132 This seems particularly true given the epistemic community of 
international arbitrators and its self-perceived goal of resolving a particular case.133 So however 
much we might view efficiency as a useful goal for remedies, it remains, at this point, a bridge 
too far for international investment law.  
 
2. Punishment of Violations 
 
 Punishment of violations is the essence of criminal law and an accepted component of 
tort law in some countries for grievous torts. In the realm of international law, however, the 
formal doctrine still generally rejects punishment as a response to violations of legal rules. The 
ASRs, for instance, state in the commentary to Article 36, “[Compensation] is not concerned to 
punish the responsible State, nor does compensation have an expressive or exemplary 
character.”134 In fact, the case law and doctrine is more nuanced, with awards and some 
                                                
130 On the last point, see Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance of 
Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 144 (1977). 
131 For commentary invoking these insights in the international investment law context, see 
Alan O. Sykes, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, 109 AJIL 296, 321 (2015) 
(suggesting lower compensation for expropriated investors to prevent overinvestment in the host 
state); Wells, supra note 108, at 478–81. 
132 Though economists have examined the effect of IIAs on investment flows to host states, 
they have not addressed the effects of different remedies on the host state, investor, or 
investment flows. See generally THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 
(Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). 
133 See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 124. 
134 ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 36, comm. para. 4. 
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scholarship endorsing the possibility of punitive awards, particularly with respect to international 
crimes.135  
 Yet in the realm of international investment law, at least, because states tend to justify 
their actions in terms of public interests, and those actions rarely involve a personal or physical 
harm to the investor, tribunals do not recognize any punitive goal, nor should they (even as we 
cannot discount the possibility that investment arbitrators act from such a perspective). Indeed, 
the ASRs’ aversion to punishment for violation of interstate duties would seem to apply a fortiori 
to violation of duties by states to foreign investors. To the extent claims, arbitrators, or 
commentators might justify greater damages for so-called unlawful expropriations because they 
serve to punish the state for breaching the treaty, that rationale offers yet another argument 
against both the term itself and the automaticity of a larger damage award.136 In examining the 
options for remedies below, we will need to avoid those that are punitive.  
 
3. Unity of Remedies for Violations of International Law 
 
 A third potential goal for remedies for expropriation is to achieve a consistency across 
doctrinal areas when it comes to violations of legal rules. For those concerned about 
fragmentation, a unified view of remedies, based on the ASRs, seems like one way to build 
coherence in the international legal order. Some investment tribunals seem to be influenced by 
this goal in their citation of ECHR cases, and in particular Papamichalopoulos, for the idea of 
FVDA as the appropriate remedy for a treaty-violative expropriation.137 
 Whatever the hopes for its proponents, such a unified approach has no place in the 
context of international investment law. First, as noted, the ASRs make clear that their reparation 
rules do not apply if the law has developed a lex specialis on the consequences of a breach.138 
The ILC’s 2006 study on fragmentation states that such special regimes—which it emphasized 
are in no way “self-contained”—are not a threat to the integrity of international law.139 
 Second, unity of remedies across regimes is particularly ill-suited for expropriations, 
which take place in numerous contexts and are adjudicated in diverse institutional settings. 
Different institutions have adopted distinct approaches to the existence of a taking—in particular, 
whether regulatory action crosses the line to a compensable taking—a trend that is not 
lamentable but rather necessary to advance the purposes of each institution and the regime it 
oversees.140 Just as a human rights regime might have a threshold for classifying governmental 
action as a taking different from that of the IIAs’ investment regime, the former might well have 
need for different remedies compared to the latter. Human rights law protects property from 
                                                
135 Nina H.B. Jørgensen, A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law, 68 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 247, 259–62 (1998).  
136 For one endorsement of punitive damages, see Sedco, supra note 25, at 204–05 and n. 40 
(Brower, sep. op.).  
137 See, e.g., ADC, supra note 61, para. 497; Tidewater, supra note 66, para. 133, n. 218.  
138 ASRs, supra note 85, Arts. 33, 55.  
139 Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, paras. 152, 192–94, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
(Apr. 13, 2006). 
140 Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of 
Fragmented International Law, 102 AJIL 475 (2008).  
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certain intrusions by the state in the context of an overall goal of protection of individual rights 
and dignity, goals that are distinct from those of the investment regime.141 And investment 
insurance regimes, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), also advance 
different goals, including encouraging domestic companies to invest abroad, while also being 
financially self-sustaining, which might justify a sui generis standard for compensation as 
reflected in an insurance contract.142  
 Uniformity for its own sake thus ignores regime-specific goals, e.g., the fourth goal 
above with respect to remedies. Moreover, it fails to take into account that a remedy for takings 
in other regimes may also necessitate a different balancing of the goals, or the possibility of other 
goals. Thus, the specific approach that I endorse below will reach its limits in a different 
institutional context. 
 
4. Distributive Justice 
 
 Finally, the case can be made that remedies should advance distributive justice, whether 
in rectifying North-South wealth inequities or those between some foreign investors and some 
developing states. In the pre-IIA era, the debates over compensation for expropriation, especially 
in the context of large-scale social changes, were intertwined with North-South debates about the 
legacy of colonialism. Some recent critiques of foreign investment law have criticized the 
substantive duties in IIAs and the process of investor-state arbitrations as exacerbating 
distributive injustices.143  
 Some of these critiques are quite persuasive, although I have argued that, under a 
conception of global justice oriented toward the protection of basic human rights rather than deep 
distributive justice, it is premature or overstated to claim that the foreign investment legal regime 
is unjust.144 A proposal for remedies for IIA violations based on advancing distributive justice 
would be useful for future lawmaking. For my purposes here, however, the key point is that deep 
distributive justice is not a goal shared by international investment law decision-makers. It is 
absent from the provisions of IIAs and not part of the considerations of arbitrators.  
 
III. EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO COMPENSATION FOR TREATY-VIOLATIVE 
EXPROPRIATIONS 
 
 Having identified five goals of remedies for IIA violations, I now use those goals to 
appraise the three main alternatives for compensation.145 Drawing on the approaches taken by 
tribunals to date, I identify three possible options:  
                                                
141 Cf. Stern, supra note 88. 
142 See Ratner, Regulatory Takings, supra note 140, at 489–93. For an example of OPIC 
coverage, see Memorandum of Determination: Expropriation of Global Forestry Management 
Group (Russia), OPIC Contract of Insurance No. F339, at 8 (Apr. 16, 2011) (citing limitation in 
compensation and investor’s duty to bear 10 percent of loss).  
143  These critiques are summarized in STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 373–77 (2015). 
144 See id. at 352–73. 
145 I will assume that restitution is not possible, an assumption justified by the remedies 
awarded even by tribunals invoking Chorzów Factory or the ASRs.  
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(1) Any violation of the criteria for a treaty-compliant expropriation will trigger the level of 
compensation provided in the IIA—an approach that sees the treaty text as offering a lex 
specialis for damages. The cases in Group 1 in Part I.B above fall into this category. 
(2) Any violation of those same criteria will trigger the customary law duty to provide full 
reparation, even as full reparation might be calculated different ways. The cases in 
Groups 2–4 in Part I.B above fall into this category. 
(3) Different violations of the IIA criteria will trigger different remedies.  
 
None of these options requires a tribunal to use the confusing lawful/unlawful terminology. They 
each begin with the assumption that the state has breached the IIA and then offer alternatives for 
the possible remedy. 
 Other options for a remedy for treaty-violative expropriations are possible. Tribunals 
could ignore violations of the first three criteria, and instead provide remedies only for lack of 
payment. While tribunals have given states a large margin of appreciation on the public purpose 
criterion,146 ignoring the other criteria would signal that the treaty text is a nullity as far as they 
are concerned. Tribunals could also just assume or conclude that (1) and (2) are the same—that 
wiping out the consequences of the expropriation means simply paying the treaty formula of 
FVDE—as seems to have been done in the cases in Group 2 in Part I.B above. Although (2) might 
lead in some situations to compensation based on the FVDE, an assumption that the customary 
international law standard for a violation and the IIA standard are the same is unwarranted.147 
 
A. A Valuation Primer  
 
 Before explaining the three options, it is important to clarify several economic concepts, 
in particular because tribunals are often not explicit about them. For simplicity’s sake, we may 
think of four points in the life of the investment dispute, at least with respect to an investment 
that is a going concern. D0 is the date the investment starts producing income; DE is the date of 
the expropriation; DA is the date of the award; and DT is the termination date, when the 
investment stops producing income, which will we, for the sake of simplicity, assume is after the 




 1. To reiterate a point made earlier, the full value of the investment at the date of the 
expropriation—FVDE—could mean one of two things: either (a) the value of the investment at 
                                                
146  See August Reinisch, Legality of Expropriations, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION 171, 178–86 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).  
147 Though beyond the scope of this paper, another option for tribunals is to provide a 
different remedy for large-scale nationalizations, as recognized by the World Bank Guidelines, 
WORLD BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: REPORT TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT, vol. II, at 43, princ. IV(10) (1992) [hereinafter WORLD BANK GUIDELINES]. 
148 In some situations, the investment ceases to produce income at some time before DA, but 
the basic conclusions below remain the same.  
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DE using information known at DE only, i.e., based on ex ante information—FVDE (ex ante); or 
(b) the value of the investment at DE using information known at DA, i.e., based on ex post 
information—FVDE (ex post). In the case of creeping expropriations, determining DE itself may 
be quite complex or it may be necessary to value the investment at a date other than DE.149  
 2. If FVDE means FVDE (ex ante), then it is calculated as the sum of: (a) the DCF from DE 
to DT, as expected at DE, discounted back to DE; and (b) interest from DE to DA.150  
 3. If FVDE means FVDE (ex post), then it is the DCF from DE to DT, i.e., the sum of: (a) 
the DCF from DE to DA, based on information known at DA, brought forward to DA; and (b) 
the DCF from DA to DT, as expected at DA, discounted back to DA.151 Thus, this second 
version of FVDE—the ex post version—includes performance from DE to DA based on 
information known at DA, whereas the first version includes only the performance from DE to 
DA based on information known at DE. 
 4. These two versions of FVDE differ only if there are events after the expropriation that 
were not predicted at DE that affect the DCF. If they had been predicted, they would have been 
priced into the FVDE. But they can differ for many reasons, e.g., unexpected changes in 
commodity prices.152 
 5. The full value of the investment at the time of the award—FVDA—is composed of two 
components: (a) the expected DCF from DA to DT, discounted back to DA, i.e., the discounted 
income stream after the award, as expected at DA; and (b) the accumulated income from DE to 
DA, i.e., the income from the expropriation to the award, brought forward to DA.153 If only (a) 
were awarded, the investor would lose the income between DE and DA.154 
 6. It is now clear that the FVDE based on ex post information is economically the same as 
the FVDA. The two consist of the same two components: the actual performance from DE to DA, 
brought forward to DA (i.e., both 3(a) and 5(b) above), + the expected performance from DA to 
DT, discounted back to DA (i.e., both 3(b) and 5(a) above).155 As a result, when tribunals use ex 
post information to calculate the FVDE, they are actually calculating—or at partially 
calculating—the FVDA. Unfortunately, tribunals are often not clear about this move.  
 7. The key economic distinction, then, between FVDE (ex ante) and FVDA is whether we 
judge value based on the expectations at time DE only; or whether we judge value based on the 
                                                
149 For a proposal suggesting valuation well before the expropriation is complete, see W. 
Michael Reisman and Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT 
Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115 (2004). 
150 The ex ante information is that known just before the expropriation, so it does not 
consider the expropriation’s effect on the value of the investment.  
151 It is important to note that all DCFs after the expropriation must be calculated on the 
assumption that the investment remains in the hands of the investor. So even information known 
to the tribunal at DA must be information relevant to a valuation based on that assumption.  
152 For an example, see Valasek, supra note 23, at 23–31. 
153 As noted in note 151, the accumulated income is also based on the assumption that the 
investor still owns the investment.  
154 See, e.g., Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 107–08; Lieblich, Determinations by 
International Tribunals, supra note 31, at 43.  
155 The rate for bringing performance forward may differ from the rate for discounting future 
income back, but the equivalence remains the same. I appreciate clarification on this point from 
Amiyatosh Purnanandam and James Hines. 
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information we have at DA (both actual returns from the past and anticipated returns in the 
future).156 As will be seen below, this economic distinction is critical for evaluating valuation 
options. Indeed, the nub of the disagreement over how to treat treaty-compliant versus treaty-
violative expropriations is over the treatment of information not available at DE.157  
 8. Finally, the formula in the typical IIA for payment to the investor must mean the FVDE 
based on ex ante information alone, i.e., the sum noted in number 2 above. This is the amount 
the state would have to pay the investor under the treaty at time DE. Obviously, the state could 
base its full valuation under the treaty only on the information it (or the market) had at the time. 
A treaty could not require payment of compensation based on actual future returns, information 
that was not yet available to the state or the investor. So, the treaty formula must be the FVDE (ex 
ante).158 However, tribunals that say they are applying the treaty formula and not some other 
value are often not clear about whether they are in fact using only ex ante information. When I 
use the term FVDE below, I am referring to the version based on ex ante information only.   
 
B. Option 1: Lex Specialis Within the Treaty—The IIA Formula for All Treaty-Violative 
Expropriations 
 
 An award of compensation based on the IIA standard—FVDE (i.e., FVDE (ex ante))—
represents a sort of built-in damages formula, under which the treaty itself specifies the 
consequences for its own violation. Awarding this amount in all situations advances some but 
not all of the goals of an expropriation remedy.  
1. With respect to repairing the damage to the investor, in one sense this formula fairly 
considers the harm insofar as it could be said that the investor will receive the value of what was 
taken, plus interest. Neither the IIA violation itself, nor the character of the violation—i.e., 
whether the process conditions were violated in addition to the nonpayment of compensation—
has an economic effect on the value of the asset.159 Economically, under the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model for valuing assets, the market price of the asset at a particular time requires the 
use of ex ante information alone because the market price of an asset reflects (predicted) risk and 
returns, not actual returns.160 We might thus say that the investor’s harm was confined to the 
value as known at that time, because the taking also removed the risk of loss from him (not 
merely the risk of gain).161  
                                                
156 FVDA will exclude other damages that might be related to an expropriation, e.g., certain 
consequential damages. 
157 Cf. Kinnear, supra note 37, at 558–59.  
158 See the posting by James Searby in the <8>OGEMID<8> Virtual Seminar on Damages in 
Investment Arbitration – Session 3, Nov. 25, 2016.  
159 See Jan Paulsson, Ghosts of Chorzów: Maha Nuñez-Schultz v. Republic of the Americas, 
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, 
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 777, 787–91 (Todd 
Weiler ed., 2005). 
160 For one summary of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, see Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. 
French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2004).  
161 See Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook and the Theory of 
Damages, 5 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 145, 153–56 (1990); Beharry, supra note 72, at 211–12. 
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 Yet we could identify the harm differently—that what was taken was the ability to hold 
and dispose of an asset as the investor chose.162 Under that view, the investor lost the possibility 
that the asset might increase in value in a way that could not be foreseen at the time it was taken, 
and so the treaty formula is inadequate to repair the damage. Although the investor would lose 
that possibility even if the state had complied with the treaty—for all the investor can do in that 
scenario is reinvest the proceeds of the FVDE paid by the state—it remains the case that the state 
breaching the treaty has deprived the investor of that choice. In terms of risk-shifting, FVDE 
shifts the risk of future, unexpected loss in value to the state; but if the investment increases in 
value, the FVDE ends up depriving the investor of those gains.  
 A famous U.S. domestic analogy concerns the litigation over the abuse of trust by the 
executors of Marko Rothko’s estate, who sold many of the artist’s works shortly after his death 
in a self-interested deal. When Rothko’s heirs sued for their recovery after the paintings had 
skyrocketed in value, the New York State courts awarded them the value of the paintings at the 
time of the trial and not the much lower value at the time they were sold.163 The appeals court 
distinguished the normal rule of trusts, under which a trustee who breaches the trust by selling 
property at an inadequate price is not liable for any appreciation damages, by noting that here 
the trustee had a duty to retain the property, so in that sense he “violated an integral condition of 
the trust . . . [making the sales] inherently wrongful transfers which should allow the owner to be 
made whole.”164 The similarity to Chorzów Factory is remarkable in the emphasis in both cases 
on the violation of an independent duty. Yet we can also ask whether the equation of treaty 
commitment with a trust, the violation of which allows for such appreciation-based damages, is 
justified. The heir betrayed by someone with a duty to act on the former’s behalf seems harmed 
in a worse way than the foreign investor protected by a treaty commitment to take property only 
under certain conditions.  
 FVDE also seems inadequate if we view the protections of the IIA in terms of the 
jurisprudential concepts discussed earlier. In the terms put forth by Jules Coleman and Jody 
Kraus, we would say FVDE is the amount to legitimate a taking done in accordance with the three 
process-criteria (analogous in some ways to the amount due the victim under a liability rule).165 
But the amount to legitimate a taking may well be inadequate—or, at least, is not necessarily 
adequate—as a measure of damages when the state does not act accordance with some or all of 
the four criteria. We may not know the correct measure of damages, but we can at least say that 
it should not be the FVDE.  
                                                
162 See Lieblich, Determining the Economic Value, supra note 74, at 63. See also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.J. 110, 119 (2002) (fair 
market value as neglecting subjective value to the owner). 
163 In re Estate of Mark Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 322 (1977) (“To make the injured party 
whole . . . since the paintings cannot be returned, the estate is therefore entitled to . . . 
appreciation damages.”). These issues have arisen in contract law’s treatment of post-breach 
events for valuation purposes, as seen in the UK House of Lords’ decision in Golden Strait Corp. 
v. Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha, [2007] UKHL 12 (Mar. 28). 
164 Id. at 321–22.  
165 See supra note 4. 
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 Moreover, the IIA formula falls short in rectifying some harms to the investor associated 
with the noncompliance with the treaty. The harms from lack of due process as well as 
unexpected departure costs and other consequential damages are not captured in it.166  
 2. With respect to correct incentives regarding compliance, this formula fares rather 
poorly. If the state pays the FVDE whether or not it complies with the treaty, with only interest to 
distinguish prompt payment from tribunal-ordered late payment, then, all other things being 
equal, the state has less incentive to comply with the IIA when it expropriates.167 States may 
have other incentives to comply with the treaty, such as the reputational harm from being a 
scofflaw or the need to attract foreign investment, but, ceteris paribus, a remedy that takes no 
account of the law violation enhances the likelihood of its repetition.  
 At the same time, payment of FVDE, plus interest, should not generally incentivize a state 
to engage in so-called “opportunistic expropriation,”168 takings where the state believes it will 
profit more with the investment under its control than it would with the investment under the 
investor’s control. The reason is that if the state and the investor both know that the investment is 
likely to generate more profits than originally expected, that expectation will be built into the 
FVDE even if it is paid later with interest.169 It is, however, possible that the state will know more 
than the investor, e.g., if it plans some regulatory changes after the takeover that will make the 
investment more profitable.  
 3. Regarding the expressive purpose, a remedy for treaty-violative expropriations based 
on the treaty formula signals that violations will not go unaddressed; for the state will still have 
to pay for its violation. However, FVDE does not send a special signal in terms of a sanction for 
the treaty violation, as opposed to the lack of payment. In that sense, it does not provide the same 
sort of control intention as would a rule based on a damages formula external to the treaty itself. 
Put another way, there is a certain sense of unclean hands when the state that goes outside the 
treaty by breaching it is required to pay only the amount specified in the treaty.  
 4. The internal treaty standard seems to advance the goal of a stable framework of 
international investment law accepted by a broad range of parties. When states agree to a treaty 
that specifies a formula for compensation for expropriation, it would seem to preserve 
confidence in the system if tribunals awarded compensation based on that formula.170 On the 
other hand, sophisticated host states ought to know that when they become parties to an IIA, they 
are agreeing to the possibility that a tribunal could award expropriation damages above FVDE for 
treaty-violative expropriations, and that if they wish to preserve FVDE as the sole formula for 
compensation, they ought to so specify in the treaty. And perhaps future IIAs will so specify. But 
for now, when host states are increasingly suspicious of investor-state arbitration, a strong case 
                                                
166 See Merrill, supra note 162, at 118. 
167 MARBOE, supra note 74, at 68.  
168 Valasek, supra note 23, at 3.  
169 Thus, in ADC v. Hungary, assuming the parties could have predicted that the airport 
would improve financially as a result of Hungary’s entrance into the EU, then the FVDA should 
have been the same as the FVDE. Indeed, the tribunal seems to rely on FVDE at a certain point in 
its valuation. See ADC, supra note 61, para. 507.  
170 See British Caribbean Bank, supra note 53, para. 261 (because article on expropriation 
was “specifically negotiated by the Parties of the Treaty . . . . there is no room for another 
method of evaluation of the compensation sought.”). For an academic endorsement, see 
Sheppard, supra note 117, at 196.  
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can be made that the treaty formula strikes a balance that will advance the durability of the 
system. This idea is expressed in arbitrator Stern’s dissent in Quiborax, where she states that 
relying on FVDE (which she emphasizes should be determined only using ex ante information) 
represents a “fair interpretation of international investment law.”171 
 5. Lastly, as for administrability, the treaty standard requires valuation of an asset at the 
time it was taken. Financial and valuation experts for the parties are working with, in essence, 
time-stamped (at DE) data on the market value of the asset, which may include a projection of 
revenue in the case of a going concern.172 As a general matter, this method, based on determining 
the expectations at DE, seems more difficult than one where the financial experts can consider 
economic data after DE, which may well account for some tribunals’ willingness to use post-DE 
data.173  
 In sum, the internal lex specialis approach, under which treaty-violative expropriations 
leads to an award of damages based on the treaty formula of FVDE (ex ante), plus interest to DA, 
advances one, or perhaps two, of the goals of a remedy—repairing the damage to the investor, if 
we to see that damages as limited to the value of the asset taken; and advancing the stability of 
the investment regime. But it does less well in terms of repairing the full harm to the investor, 
putting the right incentives on states to comply with treaties, and sending an expressive signal 
regarding the consequences of law violation, and it may be administratively difficult.  
 
C. Option 2: State Responsibility’s Default Rules—Full Reparation for all Treaty-Violative 
Expropriations 
 
 Reliance on the ASRs’ concept of full reparation for damages—“wiping out all the 
consequences” in Chorzów Factory’s famous phrasing—in the case of any treaty-violative 
takings meets some of the above-stated goals, but, as with the prior solution, not all. The 
difference between this option and Option 1 is the possibility for a tribunal to value the 
investment based on FVDA as well as to include other damages not reflected in the value of the 
investment.  
 1. Full reparation repairs the harm to the target if we see that harm as not merely the loss 
of an asset in the past. For when the state violates the treaty, it harms the investor by depriving 
him or her of the choice that the treaty provides to: (a) hold the investment and perhaps sell it 
later (i.e., the investor’s choice if the state does not expropriate); or (b) invest the FVDE proceeds 
(i.e., the investor’s choice if the state does expropriate). So, if the investor had held the 
investment and it appreciated, the state’s treaty violation has deprived the investor of the 
opportunity to enjoy that appreciation—although the investor should not enjoy any appreciation 
due to the state’s takeover of the investment (perhaps due to lower labor costs or new 
regulations). Damages based on FVDA allow for the possibility of this appreciation. While the 
investor’s foresight in keeping or selling an investment, or investing the proceeds, should not be 
assumed to be perfect, this remedy reflects that loss.  
                                                
171 Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 56 (FVDA is “biased in favor of the investors”), 59, 102 
(Stern, dissenting).  
172 See Charles N. Brower & Jarrod Wong, General Valuation Principles: The Case of Santa 
Elena, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 159, at 747, 765–68 
(discussing tribunal’s decision to avoid ex post information). 
173 See, e.g., Yukos, supra note 6, paras. 1758–69. 
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 Valuation on the date of the award, using information known since the expropriation, 
thus reflects the reality that the loss is ongoing until the date of the award. And if damages are 
supposed to be a substitute for restitution, then the award date makes the most sense because that 
is when the property would be returned to the investor, as several tribunals have recognized.174 
Though some may object that damages would then “vary with the date of the award,”175 that 
possibility is not normatively objectionable but inherent in the concept of fully repairing the 
wrong. (Indeed, total damages will change with the date of the award even when they are based 
on FVDE with interest, because of the accumulation of interest).  
 Yet what if the asset depreciates after the expropriation, due to factors not associated 
with the expropriation itself? Does full reparation then require an award of lower damages than 
the treaty standard of FVDE? It could be argued that the investor should receive less than FVDE, 
insofar as when the investment depreciates post-taking (due to forces beyond either the control of 
the state or the investor), the state’s violation of the treaty deprived the investor of only the 
depreciated value.176 But this argument does not fairly describe the harm to the investor. Rather, 
the investor had a right, under the terms of the treaty, to the FVDE. The investor’s rights under the 
treaty make any subsequent depreciation not really “countable” for purposes of the harm, and 
thus the customary law rule of full reparation would seem to require setting the treaty standard of 
FVDE as a floor. 177 This choice also means that the risk of loss is borne by the state if it violates 
the treaty. Another way to state this point is that the investor on the receiving end of a treaty-
violative expropriation should not receive less than an investor who has experienced a treaty-
compliant expropriation.178 
 The result is the formula for full reparation introduced by Judge Brower in Amoco 
International Finance, which sets the FVDE (again, based on the ex ante information) as a floor 
on the remedy.179 By giving the investor the choice of FVDE and FVDA, the Brower formula shifts 
the risk of depreciation of the asset to the state and the benefits of appreciation to the investor. 
This risk-shifting better addresses the harm to the investor from the state’s deprivation of the 
choice described above and thus provides full reparation.180  
                                                
174 See Amco Asia, supra note 71, para. 186; Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 379. The classic 
citation to this effect is GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 666 (3rd ed. 1957) 
(“If restitution in kind were possible, it would have to take place as soon as possible after the 
judgment or award.”); see also MARBOE, supra note 71, at 23; Herfried Wöss, Adriana San 
Román Rivera, Pablo Spiller, & Santiago Dellepiane, Damages in International Arbitration 
under Complex Long-Term Contracts 267–68 (2014). Whether restitution is truly preferred over 
compensation remains unclear. See Yann Kerbat, Interaction Between the Forms of Reparation, 
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 88, at 573. 
175 Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 84 (Stern, dissenting). 
176 Id., para. 103 (using this argument to show unfairness of full reparation under some 
circumstances).  
177 Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 118.  
178 I appreciate this point from an AJIL anonymous reviewer. 
179 AIF, supra note 26, at 300–01, para. 18 (Brower, concurring).  
180 Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 108, 118; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 132. But see 
Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 56 (Stern, dissenting) (arguing that this is biased in favor of 
investors).  
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 Full reparation also has the possibility of addressing the damage to the investor from the 
state’s violation of the BIT’s process conditions. That is, even if the asset has not appreciated at 
all and FVDA is nothing more than FVDE plus interest, a full reparation model can conceivably 
address the state’s failure to respect these criteria. To offer a colloquial example, if a customer 
takes an item from a store and simply drops the cash equivalent of the price on the floor, we 
might say that the shopkeeper has been harmed for a failure to follow the procedures for buying 
merchandise.181 
 In addition, the full reparation model allows for damages to include not merely the FVDA, 
but consequential damages, i.e., incidental losses to the investor from the taking. The treaty 
formula does not do so.  
 Yet full reparation has drawbacks in terms of its calibration to the harm to the investor. 
First, consider the implications of this approach for violations of the fourth, payment condition 
typical of IIAs. The host state would have to pay extra damages above the FVDE even if it has 
paid or offered a payment to the investor, as long as that amount is less than the FVDE as 
determined by the tribunal. One could argue that a state should not be able to evade damages by 
offering an insufficient amount to the investor. But insufficient payment seems materially 
different from a failure by the state to pay anything at all, and the full reparation model does not 
capture that possibility. In Coleman and Kraus’s terms, if payment according to the three process 
conditions legitimates the taking, then insufficient payment is at least closer to legitimating the 
taking than a deliberate refusal to pay, and the two scenarios should not be treated the same in 
terms of damages. The same could be said if the state has a bona fide dispute with the investor 
over who is the proper owner of the investment. Some tribunals and scholars have accepted this 
distinction by asserting that nonpayment of compensation is not always a violation of the IIA in 
the first place.182 Second, a state can violate the other three criteria in different ways, e.g., with 
insufficient process as compared to no process at all. Treating all violations the same in terms of 
the remedy ignores these nuances.  
 2. The full reparation model also seems better than the treaty formula at putting the right 
incentives on states to comply with the treaty. If we care not merely that states pay for assets that 
they expropriate, but keep the promises they have made—including the process conditions—then 
a full reparation formula offers a better incentive to comply. It requires states to internalize all 
the costs associated with the violation, including appreciation damages and consequential 
damages. States cannot merely pay late with interest.  
 3. Full reparation generally fills the gap in the expressive value left by reliance on the 
treaty formula. It sends a stronger message of the law’s relevance by treating violations as not 
mere lapses to be corrected by late payment but as wrongs by the state to be assessed by 
reference to external standards of damages. But it treats violations in a binary way, ignoring 
possible bona fides by the state. It thus risks crossing the line from acceptable expression to 
impermissible punishment.  
 4. The full reparation formula, however, raises significant concerns regarding the goal of 
furthering the stability of the international investment legal regime. As shown from the examples 
above, a state can violate the treaty in numerous ways, with different effects on the investor. A 
                                                
181 I appreciate this example from Kyle Logue. Whether this can be quantified is a matter for 
item (5) below. 
182 See infra notes 189–190 and accompanying text (Tidewater, Venezuela Holdings, and 
ConocoPhillips); Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 9–13 (Stern, dissenting). 
37
Ratner:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
 38 
reparation formula that does not capture these nuances among treaty-violative expropriations 
risks upsetting the current expectations among many states regarding their right to expropriate. If 
tribunals routinely award FVDA (or FVDE based on ex post considerations) in a way that increases 
already large awards against developing states, it could exacerbate the backlash against IIAs.  
 Certainly, states are bound by agreements they have signed, including those that entrust 
the determination of violations and remedies to arbitrators. And host state claims that restrictions 
on their ability to expropriate are a violation of their sovereignty are clearly wrong as a matter of 
law (at least since Wimbledon). But expropriation remains a power of all states, and tribunals 
should be careful about offering remedies clearly associated with other unlawful acts when the 
state may have acted in good faith, albeit inconsistent with the IIA. As noted earlier, there is a 
good case that tribunals should not apply the Chorzów Factory/ILC reparation rules to investor-
state disputes, and the ASRs themselves allow for special regimes of responsibility. The 
preservation of the system of IIAs through the confidence of all stakeholders is not advanced by 
requiring the state to pay to the foreign investor (especially one insured), in all circumstances, 
what it would have to pay another state. Thus, the risk to broad-based acceptability of the system 
is significant.  
 5. A full reparation regime also has drawbacks from the perspective of administrability. It 
requires a tribunal to determine a number of values that it need not under the treaty formula. 
First, in determining the FVDA, the tribunal must not use the actual performance of the 
investment since the expropriation, but rather the performance assuming the investor still owned 
the investment, thus excluding any increased value due to the government’s takeover.183 For the 
state should not have to compensate the investor for profits that the investor would not have 
made, just as the investor should not be prejudiced by a decline in value due to the expropriation. 
At least one tribunal, in Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhstan, refused to award the investor for 
increased value caused by the state, but the practice does not seem pervasive.184 But it may prove 
difficult for a tribunal to determine whether the government did a better or worse job than the 
investor would have done in managing the investment.185  
 Second, if full reparation means the greater of FVDE and FVDA, then the tribunal must 
determine both the FVDE and the FVDA, which requires more accounting data (and arguments 
between the parties) than does the IIA formula. The Yukos tribunal managed—in eighty pages of 
reasoning—to perform this feat when valuation turned mostly on share prices, but others using 
DCF or other valuation methods might find this quite difficult.186 Third, the tribunal must 
determine consequential damages, i.e., costs to the investor from having to abandon its 
investment.  
                                                
183 This requirement offsets a normal advantage of calculating damages as of the date of the 
award, namely that one can use actual returns after the original loss. See Wöss et al., supra, note 
174, at 268. (For indirect expropriations, the post-expropriation performance will need to assume 
the absence of those measures.) In the case of FVDE, although the tribunal must assume that the 
investor remained the owner of the asset, it should be basing its calculations solely on 
information available at FVDE (or right before the expropriation became known), which would 
not reflect the possibility of increased (or decreased) profits due to a government takeover.  
184 Rumeli Telekom, supra note 43, para. 807–13.  
185 This challenge seems to be underestimated by MARBOE, supra note 74, at 37.  
186 Yukos, supra note 6, paras. 1782–824.  
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 Thus, full reparation does reasonably well at advancing the first two goals of a remedy—
reparation of harm (though it might overcompensate the investor if we see a state’s 
underpayment based on a bona fide disagreement with the investor as a lesser harm) and 
incentives on the host state; but its binary approach to violations risks turning expression into 
punishment, it is deficient in terms of respecting the political economy of the international 
investment law regime, and it can be difficult to administer.  
 These concerns about Option 2 have significant implications for the continued relevance 
to international investment law of Chorzów Factory, which remains routinely cited by tribunals 
as the font of wisdom on remedies. Beyond the concerns noted earlier about the transposability 
of customary international law on remedies developed in the interstate context to investor-state 
disputes, and the economic anachronism of Chorzów Factory’s valuation techniques, the above 
analysis underscores two key shortcomings of applying Chorzów Factory to IIA violations. First, 
its distinctions between lawful and unlawful expropriations, and its sweeping rule for remedies 
for the latter, are oblivious to the “infinite varieties” of the way a state may take property. And 
second, its demand to “wipe out all the consequences” of a treaty violation detracts from several 
critical purposes of a remedy.  
 Thus, whatever the merits of the full reparation approach to other regimes of international 
law, or as a default rule of custom, tribunals should stop assuming its relevance as a starting 
point for remedies in investment law. There is a certain irony here, for Chorzów Factory 
originated in an investment dispute; though it has come to stand for a much broader proposition 
in customary international law, it has also become quite outdated when it comes to the remedies 
needed in international investment law.  
 
D. Option 3: The Differentiated Approach: Tailoring Remedies to the Contours of the IIA 
Violations 
 
 Under the third approach, the nature of the treaty violation determines the remedy. Rather 
than defaulting to either the treaty standard or the full reparation standard, the tribunal makes 
choices about remedies based on what the state has actually done in the course of its breach of 
the IIA. At this point I will assess this approach in terms of the five goals of remedies. I will not, 
for now, appraise any single formula that tailors remedies to treaty violations.  
 1. A differentiated approach repairs the harm to the foreign investor insofar as it links the 
conduct of the state in concreto, rather than the mere existence of a treaty violation, to the 
remedy. Investors can be harmed in different ways by treaty-violative expropriations (or even 
treaty-compliant ones). They may have faced an unfair process that did not allow them to contest 
the action; been the target of discrimination on racial, religious, or other arbitrary grounds; 
received partial payment, a promise of payment, or no payment. In addition, they may have 
incurred large expenses in contesting the action or terminating the investment (the latter of which 
they might incur in a treaty-compliant expropriation). Each of these violations has a distinct 
impact on the investor.  
 2. This approach can also create the incentives on states to comply with their treaty 
obligations. As noted above, Option 2 does this better than Option 1. At the same time, why 
should we assume that full reparation (whether FVDA, or the choice between FVDA and FVDE) 
provides the optimal set of incentives to induce compliance with the treaty? If a state refuses to 
pay FVDE but respects the process conditions, then we may be able to create an incentive for 
them to pay FVDE (i.e., comply with the treaty) by requiring them to pay the difference with 
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interest, rather than insisting on damages equal to the FVDA. If a state violates some but not all of 
the process conditions, a remedy tailored to that violation, as opposed to a default rule of FVDA, 
might incentivize the state to follow the conditions they violate. A flexible approach may do 
better at providing the “sweet spot” in which we both fairly compensate the investor and provide 
the necessary incentives on states.  
 3. A differentiated approach can advance the expressive goal of a remedy. The 
importance of a treaty commitment can be reinforced without insisting that all violations are of 
the same gravity, i.e., the signal sent by uniform recourse to either the treaty formula or a full 
reparation rule. For example, a violation of the nondiscrimination criterion might well merit a 
particularly significant remedy; failure to pay FVDE due to unsuccessful negotiations between the 
state and investor would merit a lesser remedy.187  
 4. At a time when large awards against host states face resistance, any formula for 
damages beyond the compensation specified in the IIA raises significant concerns. The 
differentiated approach, insofar as it leaves open the possibility for a tribunal to set damages 
based on standards external to the treaty, also faces this shortcoming. Yet the possibility that 
tribunals might use the treaty formula for some violations, while reserving other, external 
formulas for other violations, mitigates these concerns somewhat. A differentiated approach 
might also afford more discretion to arbitrators than the earlier two options, which might produce 
opposition from host states and others concerned about the impartiality of arbitrators.188 On the 
other hand, arbitrators already have significant discretion in damage determinations. Thus, a 
differentiated approach contributes to the viability of the regime, but only if arbitrators are able 
to justify and tailor remedies so as to maintain the confidence of states.  
 5. Compared to the treaty formula, a differentiated remedy is more complex for 
arbitrators to administer in terms of the calculation of damages because it requires looking at 
more than just the ex ante determined FVDE. Compared to full reparation, that standard could 
also be more complicated, insofar as a tribunal, instead of calculating the FVDA (or the FVDA and 
the FVDE, under the Brower formula) and consequential damages, may have to monetize other 
impacts of the expropriation on the investor. How, for instance, does one put a monetary value 
on the failure of the state to follow due process?  
 In sum, the differentiated approach offers significant promise over the other two 
alternatives. It offers the possibility of tailoring the remedy for treaty-violative expropriations to 
the harm done to the investor while maintaining the right incentives on states to comply with the 
treaty. It fulfills the expressive function better than the ASR remedy. It offers flexibility for 
maintaining the confidence of various participants in the international investment law process. 
Yet it may prove difficult to administer insofar as some of the violations may be hard to quantify.  
 
IV. OPERATIONALIZING A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO REMEDIES 
 
                                                
187 Cf. Les Laboratoires Servier, Biofarma, and Arts et Techniques du Progrès v. Poland, 
<8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA, para. 645 (Feb. 14, 2012) (tribunals have discretion to impose 
additional damages “to punish Treaty violations of particular seriousness, such as discrimination 
. . . .”). See also id., para. 642 (suggesting normal remedy is the treaty standard, i.e., in Group 2 
in Part I.B above). 
188 See generally CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 315–34 
(2014). 
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 For the differentiated approach to further the goals of investment remedies consistently 
across cases, it will need to be specified at a higher level of detail. (Thus, while I believe 
tribunals must consider the five goals in order to arrive at a new framework, once that framework 
is adopted, it should be the basis for determining remedies.) Some movement is already afoot in 
this area, even as tribunals rely on the lawful/unlawful distinction. In ConocoPhillips v. 
Venezuela, the tribunal decided that an expropriation in breach of the Netherlands-Venezuela 
BIT would lead, under Chorzów Factory, to damages based on the FVDA, but it interpreted the 
BIT’s primary obligation of compensation to require only that the state engage in good faith 
negotiations, thereby implicitly acknowledging that some forms of nonpayment might trigger a 
different remedy from others.189 In Venezuela Holdings and Tidewater, the tribunals made a 
similar distinction between refusal of payment and an offer of payment or failed negotiations 
regarding amount of payment; in both cases, the tribunals held that the Venezuela did not violate 
the IIA, and awarded FVDE.190  
 None of these tribunals, however, explicitly adopted a differentiated approach to 
violations and remedies; they rather worked within the first two alternatives above and directed 
their interpretation to the IIA’s primary obligation to compensate. That method has a significant 
flaw, however, in that it treats certain treaty breaches—notably certain types of nonpayment—as 
nonviolations. The IIA language on expropriations, however, is generally clear enough to make 
such an argument very strained.191  
 Indeed, it is conceptually flawed for a tribunal to find, as it did in Tidewater, that a bona 
fide disagreement over the FVDE is not a violation of the BIT and then to award the investor any 
compensation—how can there be compensation if there is no violation of the treaty? The 
tribunal’s solution of viewing nonpayment as still provisionally lawful, and that the parties 
merely submitted to the tribunal the task of determining payment, is not consistent with the 
request for arbitration.192 Although the text of IIAs allows for significant interpretation by 
tribunals—notably whether an action is an expropriation in the first place—if a tribunal has 
determined that an act is an expropriation, the treaty provisions on compensation do not provide 
                                                
189 ConocoPhillips, supra note 63, para. 362. See also Sheppard, supra note 117, at 171 
(calling an expropriation where only payment is lacking “provisionally lawful”).  
190 See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 65, paras. 301–06; Tidewater, supra note 66, para. 
145. Cf. EnCana Corporation v. Ecuador, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, LCIA Case No. UN3481, paras. 
194–95 (Feb. 3, 2006) (nonpayment of a legally guaranteed tax refund does not amount in the 
first instance to an expropriation if the claimant has other options and act is not willful). The 
annulment committee in Venezuela Holdings did not question the Panel’s finding that the 
expropriation did not violate the BIT. 
191 See, e.g., EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 119, ch. 8.2, Art. 16 (“Neither Party shall . . . 
expropriate . . . except . . . against payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation,” 
further defined as the “fair market value of the investment at the time immediately before the 
expropriation or the impending expropriation became public knowledge.”). A requirement of 
“just compensation” that did not mention FVDE might give arbitrators more interpretive 
maneuverability, but this was not the case in the four arbitrations mentioned. It is also possible 
that nonpayment is not per se a ground of unlawfulness under customary international law. 
192 See Tidewater, supra note 66, paras. 43–45, 55–57 (Claimants’ arguments).  
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for the interpretive space to say that payment includes nonpayment.193 Despite these difficulties, 
some commentators have suggested that mere nonpayment of compensation does not violate an 
IIA.194  
 Rather than misread the treaty language, tribunals should treat the different sorts of 
violations in the context of remedies. International investment law can thus develop a lex 
specialis with respect to remedies for treaty-violative expropriations, but not one confined to the 
internal treaty formula of FVDE. At the same time, it will not be based on a default to the ASR 
formula. Rather, it can mix these elements and perhaps bring in others.  
 It might well be the case that tribunals are already engaging in this sort of approach 
below the radar, using their discretion with the final damages number to tailor the remedy to the 
nuances of the breach.195 If they are doing so, then the result is a significant disconnect between 
that endpoint and the reasoning used to get there. Although we might applaud a tribunal for 
striking a compromise acceptable to both parties, we should be less accepting of the lack of 
transparency in its reasoning. Indeed, arbitrators who seek acceptability for their rulings beyond 
the immediate parties should want an approach based on rules.  
 In developing the specific remedies associated with IIA violations, we must continue to 
keep in mind, and advance as much as possible, the five goals associated with remedies. 
Tribunals and scholars will disagree about how a remedy fares under each of the five factors and 
the weight afforded to each factor. The solution offered here is thus not the only possible 
approach, but it does what a remedy should do significantly better than the current approaches. 
The differentiated approach proposed below is meant to be adopted and administered by 
tribunals, but it is certainly feasible to consider incorporating it directly into future IIAs.  
 
A. Rejecting Economically Flawed Formulas for Remedies 
 
 While the point may seem obvious, tribunals need to move beyond economically 
antiquated notions of damages for expropriations. In the era of modern finance, terms like 
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans simply have no place in international arbitration, even if 
civil law systems continue to use them.196 The mere usage of those terms in frequently cited 
cases such as Chorzów Factory or Amoco International Finance is not a reason for their 
retention when they lack an economic basis. They also risk the possibility of double counting of 
damages.197 It is unfortunate that they appear in some serious scholarship on expropriation.198 
                                                
193 Except in one extreme case—if the state offers FVDE, as later determined by the tribunal, 
and the investor refuses to accept payment in the hope of getting more damages during 
arbitration, then in my view the state has not violated the treaty. I appreciate this point from 
Zachary Douglas.  
194 See MARBOE, supra note 74, at 58; RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 67; Reinisch, 
supra note 146, at 198–99.  
195 I appreciate this point from Rachael Kent. 
196 See John Y. Gotanda, Damages in Private International Law, 326 RECUEIL DES COURS 73, 
105–11, 129–30, 145 (2007). 
197 See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, The Expectation Model, in EVALUATION OF DAMAGES, supra note 
82, 57, 62–65; Wells, supra note 108; Beharry, supra note 72, at 203–08.  
198 See, e.g., Sacerdoti, supra note 80; CRAWFORD, supra note 81.  
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The World Bank Guidelines offer a useful, economically rational set of valuation methods for 
different sorts of expropriated investments.199 
 
B. FVDE as the Remedy for Bona Fide Disagreements over Compensation 
 
 When a state violates an IIA by not providing the compensation required by the treaty, 
i.e., FVDE, but the violation was due to a bona fide disagreement between the host state and the 
investor over the FVDE, and the state respected the process conditions for an expropriation, then 
the remedy for such a violation should be only the FVDE (i.e., based on ex ante information), plus 
interest to the date of the award. By bona fide disagreement, I mean situations where the state is 
committed to paying the treaty amount but has legitimate disagreements with the investor that 
have prevented payment. The most obvious cases would be where the host state makes a good 
faith calculation of FVDE that the investor rejects, or a there is bona fide disagreement about the 
identity of the legal owner of the investment, but the principle would apply to similar cases 
where the state still respects the process conditions. Thus, the host state’s domestic law could 
require the government (or the investor) to follow certain administrative, judicial, or legislative 
procedures before payment is approved—which can serve as an important protection for the 
state’s treasury. If those procedures have not concluded and the investor seeks recourse to 
investor-state arbitration, we can view the disagreement as bona fide assuming the state is still 
committed to paying and the delay is justifiable under the circumstances.200  
 With respect to the five goals I have identified:  
 1. This solution repairs the most significant damage to the investor, insofar as the only 
harm was not receiving the FVDE when it was due. The state did not harm the investor by 
ignoring the process conditions or rejecting the possibility of a remedy; it did not seek to deprive 
the investor of the ability to dispose of the asset or the proceeds as the latter chose in the future. 
The harm to the investor from mere nonreceipt of the amount due under the treaty, absent more 
aggravated circumstances, is repaired by the payment of FVDE plus interest. Payment of FVDE 
completes the treaty-based process of expropriation and legitimates it.   
 As a conceptual matter, the idea of paying only the treaty amount for good faith failures 
to pay resembles the remedy that courts in the United States award when insurance companies 
fail to pay on their policies. If the failure is based on an incorrect but good faith interpretation of 
the contract, only the amount in the contract is awarded. If the company fails to pay in bad faith, 
then a greater amount is awarded (even as courts and commentators disagree on the sort of 
conduct that would justify additional damages and how much they should be).201 
 2. It puts the right incentive on states. States are incentivized to work with the investor in 
good faith in order to avoid higher damages. These negotiations, if successful, will prevent 
                                                
199 WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 147, at 41–42, principles IV(5)–(6). 
200 A separate question would be whether the FVDE determination arrived at by such 
procedures is entitled to any deference by an investor-state tribunal.  
201 See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 
636–41 (1999) (discussing key U.S. cases). The analogy is not perfect because the normal 
damages for breach of the contract, i.e., the amount specified in the contract, are based on the 
idea of expectation damages—which is akin in international law to full reparation—and the 
additional damages are generally considered punitive damages. In the case of an IIA, the 
additional damages beyond FVDE would be part of what is needed to make the investor whole. 
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violations and ensure compliance, as well as prevent litigation. While it could incentivize states 
to offer insufficient amounts and then negotiate (for the most the tribunal would later order is 
FVDE), limiting the FVDE option to good faith disagreements should constrain manipulation of 
the process. 
 3. It sends a signal that the law still matters—losing states still pay damages. At the same 
time, by treating a bona fide disagreement over payment and a state’s clear flouting of the terms 
of the treaty differently, it expresses the idea that the law treats the former less severely than the 
latter and avoids a punitive outcome. The remedy reinforces the law’s relevance even as it 
expresses a tolerance for legitimate disagreements between states and investors on the FVDE.  
 4. It reflects the political economy of the foreign investment process and thereby 
promotes states’ willingness to participate in the legal regulation of that process. It recognizes 
the failure to pay FVDE as a treaty violation, which respects the legitimate claims of home states 
and their investors; yet states’ failure to achieve a meeting of the minds with the investor on the 
amount of the FVDE or other issues will not be condemned through a harsh remedy.  
 5. Concerning administrability, on the one hand, the proposed rule requires the tribunal to 
determine only the FVDE. On the other hand, that process requires use of dated information, 
which might be difficult. More important, this proposal requires the tribunal to determine 
whether the state’s failure to pay FVDE was due to a bona fide disagreement about the price, title-
holder, or other factors. This task requires detailed analysis of the evidence regarding the parties’ 
negotiations and ultimately a verdict on blame, if any, for the failure of payment. This process 
could extend the litigation. Yet Venezuela Holdings, Tidewater, and ConocoPhillips show that 
tribunals are capable of making such an inquiry. Those tribunals looked closely at the parties’ 
interactions to conclude that in the first two, the state had acted in good faith, while in the last 
one, it had not.202 
 By offering a different remedy for one form of nonpayment than for others, even though 
both are treaty violations, this proposal is in tension with the ASRs, which do not link state 
responsibility and the duty of reparation to intent on the part of the state—leaving such questions 
for the primary rules—and provide only a limited set of circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness.203 Yet the ASRs recognize that reparation is, after all, for a harm and even (albeit 
incompletely) that a remedy should be proportional to the harm.204 So clearly less harm means 
less compensation. The idea of gradations of damages based on the severity of the violations has 
been accepted in other contexts. Notably, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission argued that 
“the law of State responsibility must maintain a measure of proportion between the character of a 
delict and the compensation due.”205  
 Finally, it is worth considering whether a state’s failure to compensate the investor 
because the former does not view its actions as an expropriation at all should be treated as a bona 
fide disagreement. In situations where the state denies that it is expropriating, it will probably not 
                                                
202 ConocoPhillips, supra note 63, paras. 382–401; Venezuela Holdings, supra note 65, paras. 
301–06; Tidewater, supra note 66, paras. 144–45.  
203 ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 2, comm. para. 10; Arts. 20–26. For example, I am not seeking 
to justify the lower payment on some claim of necessity by the state given the very narrow 
grounds of that excuse.  
204 Id. Art. 35, comm. para. 5; Art. 37(3); Art. 49, comm. para. 6 (limits of countermeasures).  
205 Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n, Final Award of Ethiopia’s Damages, para. 312 (Aug. 17, 
2009), at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/767. 
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provide due process or compensation. This case seems somewhat closer than the other bona fide 
disagreements noted above.  
 As for the harm to the investor, we could limit compensation to FVDE and address any 
additional harm from the violation of due process through proposal D below. As for incentives 
and the expressive value of a remedy, the possibility of paying only FVDE might incentivize 
states to use the indirect rather than the direct route to expropriations. But some governments 
reasonably believe that their regulations later determined by a tribunal to be expropriatory are not 
so, and FVDE thereby avoids a punitive element. From the perspective of the viability of the 
investment regime, limiting compensation to FVDE will reassure host states that their regulatory 
actions, even if ultimately found to be expropriatory, are not treated as outright refusals to pay.206 
 The countervailing concern here is administrability in terms of the tribunal’s ability to 
determine the existence of a bona fide disagreement over the expropriatory nature of the 
government’s acts. Tribunals would have to discern the seriousness of the host state’s arguments 
that it was not expropriating indirectly, even though they have rejected those arguments on the 
merits. The tribunal would have to distinguish between obvious indirect expropriations and less 
obvious ones. Yet it is certainly possible for tribunals to reach such a conclusion, suggesting that 
overall, limiting payment to FVDE for such disagreements is justifiable.  
 Treating this situation as a bona fide disagreement may, in the end, prove unnecessary to 
address host state fears that tribunals will issue large awards for indirect expropriations. For 
tribunals have been increasingly wary of claims of such expropriations, adopting a test for the 
existence of an expropriation that centers on the loss of control and not merely a diminution of 
revenue. 207  And more recent treaties contain a significantly narrower definition of 
expropriation.208 Thus, the primary rules seem to be the best site for addressing host state 
concerns about too many findings of indirect expropriations.209  
 
C. For Outright Host State Refusal to Pay FVDE, A Choice for the Investor Between FVDE and 
FVDA  
 
 If a state fails to pay the investor due to a refusal to apply the treaty standard of 
compensation, then tribunals should give the investor damages equal to the FVDA, which must 
exclude any appreciation that can be traced to the state’s ownership of the investment, with a 
                                                
206 Indeed, some of these arguments might extend to a lower standard of payment for 
regulatory takings in all circumstances. For an economic argument to this effect, see Merrill, 
supra note 162, at 134–35.  
207 See generally Ratner, Regulatory Takings, supra note 140; see also Electrabel v. Hungary, 
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/07/19, para. 6.62 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“for both direct and indirect 
expropriation . . . the requirement under international law [is] for the investor to establish the 
substantial, radical, severe, devastating or fundamental deprivation of its rights or the virtual 
annihilation, effective neutralisation or factual destruction of its investment, its value or 
enjoyment.”).  
208 See, e.g., EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 119, ch. 8.2, Art. 16, ann. on “Expropriation.”  
209 Tribunals have much more often found some of these regulations to violate the treaty’s 
standard of fair and equitable treatment, a point I address later.  
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floor of FVDE (plus interest).210 Recall, however, that, in general, FVDA will only differ from 
FVDE if the investment performed in a way that could not have been predicted at DE. Although 
rarely used in practice, nor conditioned on excluding the state’s contribution to the increased 
value of the investment, the choice between FVDE and FVDA is superior to the others in terms of 
the five goals of a remedy.  
 1. It provides the reparation that best matches the harm to the investor. The state has 
deprived the investor of the choice to hold the investment, sell it, or invest the proceeds, and the 
remedy needs to correct this harm. To do so, it needs to consider the value as of the date of the 
award based on information at that date. FVDE is justifiable as the floor because the investor was 
guaranteed that amount under the treaty, placing the risk of post-expropriation loss on the state 
breaching the treaty; but if the value has increased due to no action by the state, it must pay the 
(higher) FVDA.  
 2. This proposal also places the right incentives on the host state. By shifting the risk of 
depreciation of the investment from the investor to the state, and the risk of appreciation from the 
state to the investor, it puts a strong incentive on states to carry out their treaty commitments. At 
the same time, the state does not pay the investor for the state’s own contribution to the increased 
value, mitigating concerns that full value is punitive. 
 3. The expressive value of the remedy is also enhanced. By requiring the state to pay the 
investor potentially more than the FVDE, it imposes a special consequence for ignoring the treaty, 
as opposed to simply misinterpreting the compensation requirement. It thereby reasserts the 
importance of the duty of compensation. Nonetheless, some host states may still view the 
difference between FVDE and FVDA as a form of punishment, especially if the additional amount 
is significant (though, as noted, the two numbers will often be the same). It is hard to combat 
such perceptions, but it is also important to note that damages above FVDE need not be viewed as 
punitive.211 In this case, the state has refused to pay and violated a core obligation of the IIA, so 
the better view seems to be that any difference is aimed to address the full harm to the investor 
rather than punish the state.  
 4. With respect to the viability of the legal regime on foreign investment, host state 
governments that believe investors win too often, or receive too much, will resist any remedies 
that go beyond FVDE (and even FVDE itself). In that sense, it is inferior to applying FVDE in all 
situations.212 But the limitation of this remedy to outright refusals to pay is superior to the 
alternative of awarding FVDA for any treaty-violative expropriation. Moreover, if tribunals justify 
their finding that a nonpayment is due to a refusal by the state and not a bona fide disagreement 
covered by the prior proposal, then the imposition of the risk-shifting remedy could sit better 
with host states.  
  5. As for administrability, this remedy is more complex than the other two insofar as it 
may require a calculation of FVDA as well as FVDE. But tribunals will only have to engage in that 
calculation in a more limited set of cases than under an approach that awards the greater amount 
in the event of all treaty-violative expropriations.  
 
                                                
210 In situations where full reparation requires some amount other than FVDA, e.g., in the case 
of a partial expropriation, that amount should be awarded. 
211 See Stephan Wittich, Punitive Damages, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
supra note 87, at 667, 672. 
212 See Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 56–60, (Stern, dissenting). 
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D. A Case-by-Case Approach to Violations of a Treaty’s Process Conditions  
 
 A violation of an IIA’s process conditions accompanied by payment of FVDE is unlikely 
to lead to litigation, so the likely scenario before a tribunal involves the state’s breach of those 
criteria—typically the public purpose and due process requirements (especially the latter)—in 
addition to nonpayment. In principle, such a violation seems worse than the refusal to pay in 
isolation. Yet if the refusal to pay justifies a remedy of FVDA (with FVDE as a floor) for the 
reasons stated in the previous section, what additional damages should be awarded for failure to 
meet the process conditions? The five goals suggest that tribunals need flexibility on this issue.  
 1. Any additional harm to the investor from a violation of the process conditions would 
likely involve some sort of process-related mistreatment.213 Yet the sort of harm to the investor 
can greatly vary, and so the remedy should not replicate the approach for an outright failure to 
pay. Thus, the investor will need to demonstrate the specific harms from these violations to 
receive additional damages. One solution might be to award some expenses incurred in opposing 
the abuse of process. A more unconventional idea (that would require amending the IIAs) would 
be to award additional damages to the investor’s state of nationality. If, for instance, the investor 
faced nationality-based discrimination, such discrimination harmed the investor’s state as well.  
 2. With respect to incentives, an additional amount of damages gives the state an 
incentive to follow not merely the compensation requirement but the process conditions. States 
have put these criteria into IIAs, and they should not be treated as surplusage. Indeed, they are 
listed first in the typical treaty and offer an important measure of protection to the investor and, 
indirectly, to the investor’s home state. Moreover, compliance with them can avoid tensions 
between the host and home state after an expropriation. Thus, the law should incentivize 
compliance with them. 
 At the same time, if, for some reason, the state pays FVDE but violates the process 
conditions, and the investor still decides to sue, these incentives argue against treating a violation 
of the process conditions as the same as an outright refusal to pay. Two reasons argue for a more 
flexible approach. First, although the host state must meet the process conditions to comply with 
the treaty, in reality the payment condition is the most important from the perspective of both the 
investor and its home state. Second, given the first goal of tailoring a remedy to the harm to the 
investor, and the possibility for a range of harms as noted earlier, incentivizing compliance by 
requiring the same remedy as an outright refusal to pay would seem punitive. 
  3. With regard to the expressive purpose of a remedy, the possibility of additional 
damages sends the signal that IIA commitments are not merely about paying investors if they are 
expropriated, but about following certain standards in doing so. If the state violates those 
standards in addition to refusing the pay, the law is reinforced by an additional remedy.  
 4. Such a solution, like the prior one, raises concerns in terms of the reaction by losing 
parties. To enhance the proposal’s acceptability to host states, tribunals must pay close attention 
to the legitimate concerns of host states in expropriating property. Thus, for example, the public 
purpose criterion should be broadly interpreted; discrimination should be limited to obviously 
invidious grounds; and the due process requirement should not involve importation of the 
procedural protections we might expect in a human rights regime. If arbitrators reserve the 
finding of process violations to unambiguous situations, then the possibility of additional 
                                                
213 Although the investor may have been harmed due to these acts by the state, I am not 
suggesting that the investor’s human rights have been violated.  
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damages may be acceptable to host states.214 In the end, tribunals may choose to refrain from 
adding anything to the damages—especially if FVDA turns out to be much higher than FVDE.  
 5. In terms of administrability, this proposal places a great deal of discretion within 
tribunals as to whether to compensate for these violations, and how much. Determining the 
separate harm to an investor from the violation of the process conditions may be impossible in 
many situations. This challenge again underlines the importance of clear proof by the claimant of 
harm from the violation of those criteria.  
 
E. For Situations Other Than Bona Fide Disagreements over Payment, Payment of 
Demonstrable Consequential Damages  
 
 Lastly, where the state has violated the treaty’s process or payment conditions without 
any bona fide disagreement about compensation, then the state should have to pay consequential 
damages associated with the violation. These damages, recognized by tribunals and scholars 
alike, address the costs incurred by the investor as a result of terminating the investment under 
circumstances not provided under the treaty.215 They include costs associated with unanticipated 
or abrupt departure of personnel, unexpected transitions to government control or compliance 
with new rules, and perhaps even loss of reputation.216 (They do not generally include the legal 
costs of the arbitration or domestic remedies.) With respect to the five goals: 
 1. Consequential damages compensate the investor for unanticipated costs (even if, in 
practice, an investor can plan for or even insure against a breach of the treaty by the other side). 
At the same time, the investor should incur all the costs associated with an expropriation that is 
treaty-compliant, even if it objected to the expropriation. In those situations, the harm to the 
investor from the expropriation is, according to the treaty, fully covered by FVDE. As for bona 
fide disagreements over the compensation, consequential damages should not be awarded 
because the situation seems close to compliance by the host state. Because the state has followed 
the process conditions and is committed in principle to paying the FVDE, the investor is incurring 
only the expected costs of a treaty-compliant expropriation. If these disagreements include bona 
fide disputes over the existence of an expropriation, the state will not have followed all the 
process conditions, but on balance the good faith nature of the state’s claim suggests nonpayment 
of consequential damages as well.  
 2. Compensation for consequential damages puts the right incentive on states insofar as 
those damages would not be due if the state had followed the IIA. Rather, the investor would 
have been expected to pay them. The exception for bona fide disagreements incentivizes good 
faith negotiations.  
                                                
214 I do not regard this as analogous to the manipulation of the primary rules regarding 
compensation that I criticized earlier, because in these situations, the text is open-textured 
enough to give the tribunal the discretion to avoid finding a violation of the process conditions.  
215 See, e.g., Siemens, supra note 62, para. 352; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 304–15 
(collecting cases). 
216 See, e.g., Siemens, supra note 62, paras. 387–89; Unglaube, supra note 50, para. 307; on 
reputation, see Desert Line Projects v. Yemen, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/17, paras. 289–
91 (Feb. 6, 2008) (FET claims) [hereinafter Desert Line]; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 305–08.  
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 3. Consequential damages serve the expressive purpose of reaffirming the importance of 
expropriating only according to the IIA’s procedures. A willingness to pay FVDE should be 
treated differently from outright rejection of the treaty’s requirements.  
 4. Consequential damages might be resisted by host states, but the amounts are not likely 
to be so large that they threaten their commitment to the legal regime on foreign investment. In 
Siemens, the amount was $9 million compared to $208 million for the FVDA; in Desert Line, it 
was one million dollars compared to the roughly $20 million on the main claim.217 
 5. Lastly, consequential damages are relatively easy for tribunals to assess in that they 
typically do not involve complex determinations of market value but rather discrete expenses by 
the investor in connection with the treaty-violative expropriation. If the expense cannot be linked 
to the state’s taking of the property, then tribunals will not award it.  
 This five-part proposal thus permits tribunals addressing expropriations to tailor remedies 
to the nature and severity of any IIA violations, while avoiding the conceptual confusions of the 
lawful/unlawful distinction and that between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. It does a 
better job at advancing the purposes of a remedy than either the treaty standard for all 
expropriations or Chorzów Factory’s full reparation standard. Although not unambiguously 
superior on all five goals, the proposal is nevertheless on balance clearly superior. We could 
even reduce it to three prongs: (1) FVDE for treaty-violative expropriations characterized by a 
bona fide disagreement between the parties about the compensation (including over the existence 
of an expropriation); (2) the higher of FVDA and FVDE, along with consequential damages, for 
refusals by the state to pay compensation; and (3) a case-by-case approach to any damages for 
violations of an IIA’s process conditions.  
 
F. Next Steps for Tribunals and Treaty-Drafters 
 
 Tribunals adopting this approach, along with the secretariats that help draft their 
opinions, will need to make adjustments, both in shedding anachronistic terminology and in 
determining consequences for the violations of IIAs. Tribunals should be capable of 
distinguishing refusals to pay from nonpayments where the state and investor could not agree on 
the FVDE. For the former situations, some tribunals—Siemens, ADC, Yukos, and Quiborax—have 
already awarded FVDA, demonstrating that valuation of an investment as of that date is possible. 
With regard to violations of the process conditions, tribunals will be in new territory, as they 
have not focused on isolating damages due to violation of those criteria alone. Consequential 
damages, on the other hand, are remedies with which tribunals already have familiarity. 
 Will these new determinations by tribunals undercut the overarching goal of a more 
predictable and coherent case law? Compared to the current approach, the proposal seems like a 
significant improvement. We will have a rubric to connect remedies to the terms of the IIA and a 
more transparent framework that clarifies what losses to the investor should be compensated. 
Counsel and tribunals can focus on relevant questions about the actions of the host state and their 
impact on the investor: Did the state have a bona fide dispute with the investor over payment or 
the existence of an expropriation, or did it simply refuse to pay the treaty amount? Did any 
violations of the process conditions have an effect on the investor? Did the investor prove any 
consequential damages? These questions are more pertinent to remedies and more judicially 
                                                
217 Siemens, supra note 62, para. 403; Desert Line, supra note 216, paras. C.5, C.9 (converted 
to dollars).  
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manageable than figuring out whether an action was lawful or unlawful as well as what the PCIJ 
meant in Chorzów Factory. On the damage calculations, valuation experts will still offer 
tribunals divergent figures, but claimants and tribunals can at least work from a generally shared 
appreciation of the economic concepts of FVDE and FVDA. That understanding includes the need 
to exclude post-expropriation information from the former and include it in the latter, the limited 
circumstances in which the two numbers will differ, and the necessity of excluding from FVDA 
any unexpected increase in value due to the government’s takeover.  
 Finally, the approach can be implemented with even greater predictability and authority if 
states incorporate it in the treaties themselves. Thus, we could imagine a new provision in IIAs, 
after the standard expropriation article, that tells a tribunal what to award when the state 
expropriates in a manner inconsistent with each of the four standard requirements. For instance, a 
new clause might say, “A state’s failure to pay the amount specified in the fourth criterion [i.e., 
FVDE] due to a bona fide disagreement with the investor [over a defined set of issues] shall not 
entitle the investor to damages beyond the FVDE.” Another could note that FVDE must be 
calculated, if at all possible, based on information known at DE. And another might say, “A 
tribunal may award consequential damages to investors if and only if they can demonstrate the 
additional expenditures due to failure to meet the third [due process] requirement.” Along with 
reformed case law, any of these clauses would help move toward a true lex specialis for remedies 
for IIA violations.218  
 Yet, as noted earlier, this proposal is not simply transferable to a prescriptive process 
addressing a regime with different goals. It may well prove a poor fit for a human rights treaty or 
an investment insurance contract. Indeed, two or more states concluding an IIA might decide 
among themselves that expropriation should be compensated in yet another way, e.g., FVDE no 
matter what the circumstances of the taking.  
 
V. RELEVANCE FOR VIOLATIONS OF FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT PROVISIONS? 
 
 If we look beyond expropriations, the five goals for remedies identified above can also 
guide the choice of remedies for other IIA violations. The bulk of claimant victories today center 
on violations of the requirement that the state afford the investor fair and equitable treatment 
(FET), which treaties and tribunals increasingly define as the minimum standard under 
customary international law. As with expropriations, treaties do not specify damages for FET 
violations. Instead, tribunals have reflexively cited Chorzów Factory, trying to determine exactly 
what harm the FET violation caused the investor (in addition to the major interpretive disputes 
about the content of the customary law standard).219 Some tribunals have analogized FET 
violations to expropriations and used the treaty standard of FVDE to assess the damages for an 
FET violation.220 This last course of action seems odd insofar as the text nowhere contemplates 
FVDE as the damages for an FET violation but only as the compensation for an IIA-compliant 
expropriation.  
                                                
218 For further thoughts, see Rukia Baruti, Available Remedies in Investment Arbitration: Is 
There a Need for Explicit Provision in Investment Treaties? <8>OGEMID<8> Virtual Seminar, 
supra note 158. 
219 See the cases discussed in MARBOE, supra note 74, at 87–88. 
220 See Wena Hotels, supra note 40, para. 118; CMS, supra note 123, para. 410; see generally 
discussion in MARBOE, supra note 74, at 94–96.  
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 Although a full treatment of the proper formula for FET violations is beyond this study, 
the approach above suggests that neither FVDE nor FVDA should represent the exclusive 
remedies. FET violations need not deprive the investor of the full value of the investment. 
Rather, where an investor has been economically harmed by a violation of FET, but still retains 
control of the investment at time X—which may be the date of the award or some point in the 
past when it sold the investment—tribunals should adopt a valuation method that identifies the 
difference between the value of the investment at time X and the value of the investment at time 
X in the absence of the FET violations (what I will call FVx), while insisting that the latter value 
be proved with a high degree of certainty.221  
 The diminution in value approach seems to do well under the first three goals for 
remedies. The investor is effectively compensated for what it lost; the state is given a calibrated 
incentive to respect the FET provisions (although the tribunal could determine the content of that 
standard in a way that would send the wrong incentives to states, e.g., with regard to their 
regulatory power); and the treaty’s expressive value is protected.  
 As for the fourth goal, maintaining the regime’s viability, if the substantive standard for 
liability is set at the right level, and the award is calibrated to the difference in value, then in 
most cases the award will be short of FVx (or FVDA if the investor still holds the asset at the date 
of the award). But in those cases where the investor loses a large portion of the investment’s 
value and the asset unexpectedly increases in value (not due to actions by the host state) after the 
FET violation, an award approaching FVDA may be a possibility; such an award could meet 
significant resistance from host states. Administrability may also be difficult because of the need 
to estimate the value of the investment in the absence of the regulatory measures, although 
tribunals have claimed to have done this.222  
 One way to address the fourth concern would be to cap damages at the full value on the 
date the FET violation began (plus interest), based on the information known at the time, on the 
theory that the host state should never be liable for more than the amount it would have had to 
pay the investor if it had totally taken the investment at that point. This approach would 
effectively analogize the FET violation to the bona fide disagreement over compensation in the 
case of expropriations, where FVDE is the upper limit of damages. Given the significant concerns 
of host states that their regulations may lead to investor-state arbitration and violations of the 
FET provisions of IIAs, this sort of cap could be useful. But if an FET violation is based on a 
deliberate violation of assurances meant to attract the investment in the first place—the standard, 
for instance, in Glamis Gold223—the analogy to a bona fide disagreement seems strained, and it 
seems more like an outright refusal to pay. 
 So, as with expropriation, the method used by tribunals needs to be nuanced to the 
nature—not merely the existence—of the FET violation. And, as with expropriation, rote 
invocation of Chorzów Factory is a way of avoiding that nuance. Instead, tribunals could 
develop some principles, analogous to the ones I have developed for expropriations, that would 
calibrate damages to the severity of the FET violation, without crossing the line to punishing the 
                                                
221 For a recent case, see Micula v. Romania, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/20, paras. 
944–48 (Dec. 11, 2013) (endorsing this method as flowing from Chorzów Factory). 
222 See id., paras. 950–1118. 
223 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, para. 627 (June 8, 2009); see 
also Clayton and Bilcon v. Canada, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. 2009-4, paras. 445, 589 
(Mar. 17, 2015) (reneging on “specific representations” triggers FET violation). 
51
Ratner:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
 52 
host state. Because even reneging on assurances given to the investor can come in gradations, 
tribunals could take into account more explicitly what a reasonable investor should have 
expected in terms of risks, or the reasons the state reneged on its assurances. Good faith or lack 
thereof by the state should thus be relevant not merely to the identification of a violation of a 
primary rule, but to the damages as well. Consequential damages should be limited to those 
expenses completely unforeseeable to the investor. The investor’s conduct should also be a 
relevant factor. 
 These sorts of principles could also be put into treaty text to clarify the factors that a 
tribunal may consider in determining damages for FET violations. At a minimum, a treaty could 
say that damages shall be limited to proven revenue directly traceable to the FET violation. But 
provisions that link the damages to the gravity of the FET violation—not merely whether it fell 
short of the Glamis (or other standard), but by how much—could also be helpful, as well as 




 The differentiated approach provides tribunals with a new framework for decision-
making that better advances the goal of remedies and allows them to tailor the remedy to the 
circumstances of expropriations. It takes seriously the decision of states to specify an amount the 
host state is obliged to pay in the IIA itself and the practice of many tribunals to award that 
amount. It also acknowledges the relevance of the concept of full reparation for treaty breaches 
while also moving beyond a simple doctrine—and one old PCIJ case—that does not capture 
when full reparation to a foreign investor is warranted. It builds on the distinction that some 
tribunals have made between bona fide disagreements over payment and a refusal to pay, as well 
as the practice of tribunals to award consequential damages when investors can prove them. In 
that sense, it offers a new, but not radical, step for tribunals. At the same time, by introducing 
new variables, this approach, whether by a tribunal or in a treaty, has its own risks to 
predictability. But given the enormous discretion tribunals already have when working under the 
ASRs reparation standard to arrive at a figure for damages, breaking the damages down more 
transparently would make for more persuasive awards.  
 The dissatisfying state of the case law on expropriation remedies, and the possibility for 
improvement through the approach offered here, also bring out some of the deeper structure of 
the rules of responsibility for violations of IIAs. Both of the status quo approaches—FVDE 
always and full reparation always—treat all the state’s duties and violations the same 
notwithstanding the overall structure of the typical IIA’s provisions on expropriation. Reparation 
through FVDE treats the investor-state relation as if the investor has a limited entitlement that 
allows the state to take the property as long as it paid FVDE (similar to a liability rule). And full 
reparation treats the investor-state relation as if even a relatively minor deviation from any of the 
treaty’s terms is equivalent to a seizure of the investment. A choice between compensation based 
on the underlying primary rule—in the IIA—and the secondary rules—in the ILC’s ASRs—
leaves tribunals with a narrow range of legal positions for remedies, even if they may exercise a 
great deal of discretion in coming up with the final number.  
 The differentiated approach thus offers a challenge to the separation of primary and 
secondary rules that has become accepted since the issuance of the ILC’s ASRs. Though the 
ASRs do not rule out that each treaty or specialized regime can have its own rules on the 
consequences of a state’s responsibility, the separation has limited the options for remedies. 
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Investment law has not developed its own rules, and certainly not any sensitive to the primary 
rule that has been violated. The approach I offer links investor rights/state duties and remedies 
more directly, which is a particularly important for a regime under a barrage of criticism from 
both states and nonstate actors. For a relatively new area of international law to maintain its 
acceptability to this range of global participants, it needs to develop more nimble doctrines. 
Human rights law shows an alternative path, as it has evolved through new tools such as a 
recognition of the state’s duties to protect against private violators, the margin of appreciation, 
and the acceptance of nonpecuniary damages.  
 In the end, the choice for states, and tribunals, is whether to rely on Chorzów Factory and 
the ASRs as the Α and Ω—chronologically and metaphorically—for damages calculations, or 
whether to develop an alternative more attuned the reality of expropriations and other IIA 
actually as well as the goal of remedies. International investment law has now matured, as it 
were, so that we ought to be able to do better, either in case law or treaty text, in calibrating 
compensation to violations. It is time for a true lex specialis that makes clear to all the 
participants in the international investment law process the consequences if a host state—or a 
foreign investor—breaches its commitments under an IIA.  
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